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by Roland Victor Jimenez de Guzman 
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The U.S. Navy has had its own internal combat construction engineer force for over 60 years: the Navy 
Seabees.  The motto of this cadre of engineering professionals is elegantly simple: With compassion for 
others; We build - We fight; For peace with freedom.  The centerpiece unit of the Naval Construction 
Force is the U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion: an entirely self-sufficient sustainable combat 
service support team trained to conduct contingency construction operations and defensive infantry 
combat operations.  NMCBs cycle through a continuous training program designed to maintain their 
combat readiness and prepare them for rapid deployment in response to emergencies around the world.  
They must be ready to go into austere forward combat zones worldwide to provide direct combat service 
support of the US Marine Corps and other military forces as directed by the National Command 
Authority. 
In peacetime, these eight active duty battalions execute a complex program of construction projects all 
over the world as a training platform to maintain their combat readiness by sharpening their technical 
expertise and construction skills.  However, their two-fold “Build and Fight” mission statement has 
significant consequences for the Naval Construction Force as a construction organization.  As with most 
other engineered systems and organizations, Human and Organizational Factors (HOFs) are a primary 
element that determines system quality.  Considerations such as training and selection of personnel, task-
organization, command culture and incentives all work together and affect the reliability of this system 
just as much as technical considerations such as design development and site conditions. 
This work will perform an in-depth analysis of the HOFs that determine system quality of the U.S. Naval 
Mobile Construction Battalion as they execute their Deployment Construction Program by: 
1. Describing the HOFs embedded in this system and how these factors impact quality.  
2. Describing the approaches that the NCF takes to ensure quality. 
These system components and approaches will be analyzed to determine how HOFs impact quality and 






Dates Covered (from... to) 
- 
Title and Subtitle 
Human and Organizational Factors in the U.S. Naval
Construction Force A Qualitative Analysis of the U.S. Naval




Program Element Number 
Author(s) Project Number 
Task Number 
Work Unit Number 
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) 
Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy
Performing Organization Report Number 
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es) Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) 
Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) 
Distribution/Availability Statement 
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Supplementary Notes 





Classification of this page 
unclassified
Classification of Abstract 
unclassified 
Limitation of Abstract 
UU
Number of Pages 
152
Department of Defense policy and doctrine, construction industry literature and research files from recent 
Seabee deployments.  It also draws upon individual interviews with Seabees from both the Atlantic and 
the Pacific Fleet operating areas. 
This work will conclude with recommendations to improve the system to raise the level of quality in the 
Deployment Construction Program, a sample instruction module to guide system operators in properly 
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Executive Summary 
The U.S. Navy has had its own internal combat construction engineer force for over 60 years: the Navy 
Seabees.  The motto of this cadre of engineering professionals is elegantly simple: With compassion for 
others; We build - We fight; For peace with freedom.  The centerpiece unit of the Naval Construction 
Force is the U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion: an entirely self-sufficient sustainable combat 
service support team trained to conduct contingency construction operations and defensive infantry 
combat operations.  NMCBs cycle through a continuous training program designed to maintain their 
combat readiness and prepare them for rapid deployment in response to emergencies around the world.  
They must be ready to go into austere forward combat zones worldwide to provide direct combat service 
support of the US Marine Corps and other military forces as directed by the National Command 
Authority. 
In peacetime, these eight active duty battalions execute a complex program of construction projects all 
over the world as a training platform to maintain their combat readiness by sharpening their technical 
expertise and construction skills.  However, their two-fold “Build and Fight” mission statement has 
significant consequences for the Naval Construction Force as a construction organization.  As with most 
other engineered systems and organizations, Human and Organizational Factors (HOFs) are a primary 
element that determines system quality.  Considerations such as training and selection of personnel, task-
organization, command culture and incentives all work together and affect the reliability of this system 
just as much as technical considerations such as design development and site conditions. 
This work will perform an in-depth analysis of the HOFs that determine system quality of the U.S. Naval 
Mobile Construction Battalion as they execute their Deployment Construction Program by: 
1. Describing the HOFs embedded in this system and how these factors impact quality.  
2. Describing the approaches that the NCF takes to ensure quality. 
These system components and approaches will be analyzed to determine how HOFs impact quality and 
impact system operators to ensure quality.  This qualitative analysis draws upon existing Navy and 
Department of Defense policy and doctrine, construction industry literature and research files from recent 
Seabee deployments.  It also draws upon individual interviews with Seabees from both the Atlantic and 
the Pacific Fleet operating areas. 
  
This work will conclude with recommendations to improve the system to raise the level of quality in the 
Deployment Construction Program, a sample instruction module to guide system operators in properly 
assessing HOFs and discussion regarding new force structures and deployment schedules.
  1  
1 Naval Construction Force: Background and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
The Naval Construction Force is the engineer force of choice for the United States armed forces.  Since 
their birth in 1942, the Navy Seabees have lived by their motto: “We Build, We Fight.  For Peace With 
Freedom”.  The mission of the Seabees is as follows: 
With compassion for others – we build, we fight – for peace with freedom. We provide the Navy, 
Marine Corps, Unified CINCs, and other customers with rapid contingency response, quality 
construction, disaster recovery support, and humanitarian assistance. 
We accomplish this through expeditionary units, which are rapidly deployable, interoperable, self-
sustaining, and capable of conducting defensive military operations.1 
Put simply, Navy Seabees build expeditionary shore based facilities for Marines and are prepared to 
conduct defensive combat operations to defend what they build.  The Naval Construction Force is 
comprised of a wide variety of construction units capable of a whole spectrum of contingency 
construction and defensive combat operations. 
1.2 Naval Construction Force History 
Navies around the world have had organic construction capability for almost as long as they have put 
ships out to sea to sail into harm’s way.  The U.S. Navy itself began using sailors to build its shore 
facilities as far back as the War of 1812; when they did so under fire. 
But the U.S. Navy Seabees as we know them today were born during World War II.  One of the critical 
keys to victory in this global conflict- in both the Pacific and European theaters- was the development of 
robust forward logistic support infrastructure (as it is in any combat operation).  The troops out on the 
front lines needed shore-based infrastructure to properly prosecute campaigns including (but not limited 
to): main supply roads, forward expeditionary airfields, port facilities, command and control structures 
and troop housing.  The Navy used the same system for building this infrastructure that they used for 
building any overseas Navy shore base: American civilian general contractors.  However, there were two 
major inter-connected problems with this system.  These civilian contractors were expert builders, but 
were not trained for combat.  Their building capability severely degraded under fire and they were not 
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trained to defend themselves.  Worse yet, civilian contractors were not afforded the same protection under 
international laws of armed conflict as uniformed military service-members.  Essentially, when these 
civilians took up arms to defend themselves and their work, they became spies: combatants who were not 
formally assigned to their country’s armed forces.  This meant that these construction workers became a 
glaring weakness in the overall logistics support of the combat operation. 
To put this concept another way, the civilian general contractor system as a construction delivery vehicle 
was not robust when placed into a combat zone; it was not able to operate after sustaining damage.  And 
if any construction delivery vehicle needs to operate after sustaining damage, it is one placed in a combat 
zone.  This is where Rear Admiral Ben Morrell came into the picture.  At the time, he was the head 
officer of the Civil Engineer Corps in his job as the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.  This bureau 
was the Navy organization charged with the construction of the Navy’s shore establishment; it was the 
forerunner to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command of today.  RADM Morrell and the members of 
his staff were visionaries who created the Naval Construction Force as we know it today.  On 05 January 
1942, RADM Morrell received specific authority from the Navy Bureau of Navigation to recruit men 
from construction trades to form a three Naval Construction Battalions and one Naval Construction 
Regiment.  After about 3-6 weeks of boot camp and recruit training, the first Seabees started reporting for 
duty in the European and Pacific theaters. 2 
These Seabees proved themselves time and again during World War II with their courage under fire, their 
ingenuity and their technical expertise.  In the Atlantic theater, Seabee operations ranged from the 
construction of overseas bases in the Caribbean, to the first Seabees in combat building military facilities 
in northern Africa.  In fact, it was during the buildup of forces in Tunisia that the Seabees invented one of 
their most significant and lasting contributions to modern naval warfare: the pontoon.  In order to rapidly 
move equipment and material ashore, the Seabees took standard steel shipping crates and fitted them with 
special tackle so they could be hooked together to form causeways, piers and other structures.  This 
dramatically reduced onload and offload cycles, which was the main stumbling block in most amphibious 
landings.  Thanks to these “magic boxes”, beachheads such as Sicily that were previously thought 
unassailable became legitimate places for amphibious operations.  This put the Allies on the road to the 
D-Day assault at Normandy and eventually on to victory in the European theater.  In the Pacific Theater, 
Seabees were equally critical to the Allied war effort.  As the Allies embarked on the “island-hopping 
campaign” westward across the Pacific, Seabees marched side-by-side with their comrades in the Marine 
Corps.  Of particular note here was the birth of the Seabee mission of rapid runway repair and 
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expeditionary airfield construction.  One of the crucial tactical aspects of the island hopping campaign 
was the ability to use the islands as intermediate logistics bases.  This meant there was a strong 
requirement to be able to create infrastructure at these islands: refueling points, supply roads, berthing 
facilities, airfields and runways.  During combat operations, the airfields and runways became absolutely 
critical, so the Seabees became adept at repairing them under fire and in short timeframes.  After enemy 
bombing runs, the Seabees had to be able to get the airfields back up to operational status before the 
enemy aircraft had time to depart, re-arm and return for the next bombing run.  Many of today’s tactics 
for rapid runway repair were born in this crucible of combat: both technical tactics (selection of repair 
material and methods for rolling it onto the airfield for compaction) and operational tactics (clearing 
unexploded ordnance and selecting operating airstrips). 
World War II was the cradle of the Seabees where they were born, but they have distinguished themselves 
in every major conflict since then as well.  Their ingenuity, work ethic and courage under fire have made 
them indispensable parts of the Navy’s operational plans.  As General MacArthur once said, “The only 
problem with Seabees is I don’t have enough of them.” 3 
1.3 Civil Engineer Corps and Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
The Naval Construction Force is led by naval officers from the U.S. Navy Civil Engineer Corps (CEC).  
The CEC is a subset of the Navy’s officer community whose primary focus is the life-cycle management 
of the Navy’s shore establishment.  Therefore, one of the core competencies (besides engineering) of the 
CEC is leadership.  This has dramatic influence on the role of CEC Officers as Project Engineers in the 
NCF. 
1.3.1 The US Navy Civil Engineer Corps 
As background, the US Navy divides its officer corps into two distinct communities: the Line community 
and the Staff Corps.  Officers of the Line are assigned duty “on the tip of the spear” in the Navy’s 
operating forces: they drive the surface warships, dive deep under the seas in Navy submarines and fly 
high over the seas in Naval aircraft.  The officers of the Staff Corps provide direct support to the 
operating forces as warrior/logisticians in the Supply Officers, doctors in the Medical Corps, nurses in the 
Nurse Corps and other diverse communities.  There are certain specific statutory and cultural/ historical 
implications of membership in the Line community or the Staff Corps, but all officers serve in equal rank 
structures. 
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Core Competencies  
The Civil Engineer Corps stands as one of these Staff Corps communities and is tasked with the life-cycle 
management of the Navy’s shore establishment, as mentioned above.  The Civil Engineer Corps has 
articulated three deeply inter-related core competencies for its officers in order to successfully manage the 
shore establishment.  These competencies are listed in the CEC Career Planning Guide: 
Naval Officer competency is defined as your commission and the associated military knowledge and 
experience. 
Engineer/Technical Professional competency is your engineering or architecture degree, 
professional registration and the associated technical knowledge and experience. 
Acquisition/Business Professional competency is your acquisition certification and warranting as 
well as the knowledge and experience in business practices.4 
CEC Duty 
Duty in the CEC primarily falls into three categories: Public Works, Construction Contract Management 
and duty in the Seabees.  Each CEC officer is encouraged to serve in all three mission areas during their 
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Figure 1: CEC Competencies 
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careers.  Promotion to more senior ranks is highly dependent on 
performance in all three areas as shown in Figure 2.5 
Public Works: The day to day operation and maintenance of the 
Navy’s shore facilities.  The Navy has shore installations of various 
sizes all over the world.  Each one of them requires a public works 
force of some sort to maintain the buildings, roads, utilities and 
land.  CEC Officers manage this public works activity, whether it 
is performed in-house by Navy civil service employees or by 
civilian contractors. 
Construction Contract Management:  The construction of the 
Navy’s shore establishment is primarily completed via contract 
with civilian general contractors.  For the most part, these complex 
construction contracts are managed by CEC Officers who are 
called Resident Officers in Charge of Construction (ROICC).  
[They] are the Navy's project managers and construction contract 
managers…[whose] basic task is to ensure that Navy construction 
projects are built safely, as designed, on time, and within budget.6 
Project managers are responsible for their projects from beginning 
to end. This includes supervision of the initial design, awarding the 
contract, overseeing the construction, monitoring progress, 
negotiating changes, and accepting the completed project. Tasks 
may include resolving design problems, coordinating construction 
schedules with Navy operations, ensuring that payments correctly 
reflect progress, and managing the project budget. 
Seabees:  A small percent of the Navy’s CEC officers are fortunate 
enough to serve in the NCF.  Generally around 12% of the CEC 
dons the camouflage uniforms of the Seabees and leads the brave 
men and women of the NCF.  Their role- as leaders and as 
engineers- will be discussed in greater detail later in this work. 
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6 http://www.cec.navy.mil/contracting.html  
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As stated earlier, promotion to more senior ranks in the CEC is dependent upon service in all three 
mission areas.  This is because each senior CEC officer- especially those in command- must have 
personal first-hand experience in every mission area because they are all inter-related.  Since the Seabees 
are a small numerical part of the CEC billet structure, competition for billets in Seabee battalions is very 
tight.  This will be discussed in further detail later on in this work. 
1.3.2 Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is the Navy’s prime agent for the management of 
shore facilities.  Its mission statement is listed in the NAVFAC Strategic Plan: 
We are the Navy’s facilities, installation, and contingency engineers. 
We serve the Navy and Marine Corps team, Unified Commanders, Department of Defense and other 
federal agencies. 
We plan and deliver innovative, technology-leveraged solutions and alternatives to meet our clients’ 
needs.7 
NAVFAC is a “systems command” which means that it is responsible for the entire life-cycle of the 
program it manages: the shore establishment.  (In like manner, the Naval Air System Command manages 
the life-cycle management of Naval Aviation assets; the Naval Sea Systems Command manages the same 
for surface ships, etc.).  As such, it is the Navy’s single management agency for shore facilities.  
Obviously the Civil Engineer Corps and NAVFAC share a very close relationship; the CEC is the Navy’s 
main cadre of uniformed facilities engineers so they are a crucial part of NAVFAC’s leadership.  In fact, 
the commander of NAVFAC is also assigned duty as the Chief of the Civil Engineer Corps. 
While NAVFAC does not exercise direct operational or administrative control over the Naval 
Construction Force, there is a deep inter-relation between the leadership of NAVFAC and the NCF.  
NAVFAC is the NCF’s primary technical advisor, providing most of the guidance for all phases of NCF 
operations. 
1.4 U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 
The centerpiece of the Naval Construction Force is the U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 
(NMCB).  There are 8 active duty battalions and 12 reserve battalions who maintain a continuous 
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developmental training cycle so they can maintain their military readiness to deploy world-wide.  Each 
battalion is its own self-sufficient construction organization complete with a vertical construction 
component (a full suite of heavy equipment and the requisite operators and mechanics), a horizontal 
construction component (builders and steelworkers) and a utilities component (electricians and plumbers).  
There is also a whole host of support personnel including (but not limited to) engineering technicians, 
quality control inspectors, project engineers and safety inspectors.  In order to ensure self-sufficiency, 
each active NMCB is assigned all of the tools and equipment required to go into the field. 
1.5 NMCB Readiness and Training Cycle 
In order to train for their wartime “build and fight” mission, NMCBs embark on a cyclic peacetime 
construction program as a training “proving ground” to keep their technical skills sharp.  As each 
battalion goes around this cycle, their military readiness ranges from low (unable to deploy without 
considerable effort) to high (currently deployed and ready to respond to any contingency).  This is 
graphically represented in Figure 3 below.  
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Military readiness in any deployable military unit in the United States armed forces is defined by two 
concepts: 
· the unit’s ability to accomplish the list of tasks they are required to be capable of (Required 
Operational Capabilities- ROCs) 
· the unit’s ability to accomplish ROC tasks in the expected environments they will have to execute 
them (Projected Operating Environments- POEs). 
This standardized format is reported up the chain of command on a monthly basis by every deployable 
operational military unit in the US Armed Forces.  Combat readiness is measured according to a 
standardized formula used throughout the Armed Forces and takes three quantities into account: 
· Manning levels- Does the unit have enough people at the right pay-grade? 
· Training attainment- Does the unit have teams and individuals who have had the requisite training 
for their assigned tasks? 
· Material readiness- Does the unit have enough tools, equipment and material to execute a given 
mission? 
These quantities are compared against nominal quantities that a battalion is supposed to achieve for a 
given level of readiness.  This comparison forms the basis for a mixed quantitative-qualitative measure of 
the unit’s military readiness and is one of a Seabee battalion’s most important “report cards”.  A list of 
ROCs and POEs for a U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion is included in Appendix 1 for review. 
1.6 NMCB Deployment Cycle 
The culmination of a battalion’s training cycle is a six-month overseas deployment.  During these 
deployments, the entire battalion moves- as a unit- to its deployment site: an overseas Seabee Camp that 
is located at an overseas Naval Station.  The three forward Seabee Camps are: 
· Camp Covington located at U.S. Naval Activities, Guam 
· Camp Mitchell located at U.S. Naval Support Activity, Rota Spain 
· Camp Shields located at Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan 
  9  
 
Figure 4: Seabee Forward Deployment Sites8 
The main purpose for these deployments to forward, overseas camps is to facilitate the mobilization of the 
deployed battalion to world-wide emergencies (referred to as contingencies) as the National Command 
Authority may assign.  Each deployed battalion is designated as the “alert battalion” for the geographical 
region of their forward camp.  As an example, if there were a contingency operation in northern Europe 
that required Seabee support, the alert battalion from Rota Spain would redeploy whatever engineer 
forces were required to support the operation. Deployed Seabees have participated in every major conflict 
since World War II including recent operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom, Joint Task Force 
Eagle (Bosnia), Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 
While the alert battalion is waiting to be called upon, they execute a pre-determined set of construction 
projects at their camp’s host Naval Station.  It is important to note that this construction program is put on 
hold in the event of a large scale operation requiring the re-deployment of the battalion.  To again cite the 
previous example, if Rota’s alert battalion were to be redeployed to northern Europe, the construction 
projects they were working on at Naval Station Rota, Spain would be put on hold until the battalion’s 
return. 
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A battalion will execute thousands of man-days of construction effort over a wide spectrum of projects 
during a normal deployment.  These projects build quality shore facilities for the host Naval Station in a 
proven, win-win relationship.  The NMCB receives valuable technical training and the host Naval Station 
receives quality shore facilities.  Since there are three battalions deployed at any given time, projects are 
being developed on a continual basis. 
  11  
2 Background Theory 
This work began as a term project for a graduate class at the Masters’ level in civil engineering at the 
University of California at Berkeley.  This course was called Human and Organizational Factors: Risk 
Assessment and Management.  The analysis that follows is deeply rooted in the material from this course, 
so it is therefore appropriate to provide some of this background. 
1.1 System Theory 
Most analyses of engineered systems focus on the tangible infrastructure that is designed and built by a 
team of engineering professionals.   However, this academic work’s analysis is a variation on this theme: 
it is an in-depth look at the U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion as an engineered system.  This 
author’s premise is that the team of engineering professionals is itself the core system and is therefore the 
appropriate focus of analysis, not the end product of their labor.  Bea says that engineered systems have 
seven components that are highly interactive and interrelated as shown in Figure 59:  
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Figure 5: System Components 
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For many systems, most of the focus is typically directed towards the end product of this system: the built 
facilities.  However, the Navy Seabees recognize that the end product of this system is really two-fold, the 
built facilities and the trained cadre of Seabees that build those facilities.  This work will focus on both of 
these end products and how the system’s characteristics impact the quality of those products. 
1.1.1 System Performance 
Now that we have explained how systems are composed, it is important to explain how they operate.  To 
simplify the analysis and organize this explanation, there two aspects of the performance of any 
engineered system:  operator performance and organizational performance. 
1.1.1.1 Operator Performance 
Rasmussen proposed in 1982 a simple, yet powerful taxonomy for classifying human performance into 
three levels: skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based.  Knowledge-based performance is the most 
cognitively demanding level: the activity is new to the operator so he or she must individually analyze 
sensory input and use stored knowledge to determine the appropriate course of action.  Rule-based 
performance requires less cognitive resources from the operator because it involves responding to familiar 
problems to which stored, standardized rules can be applied.  The operator must simply choose which rule 
applies which then dictates the appropriate course of action.  The final level of performance is skill-based 
performance.  This least cognitively demanding level is based somewhat on repetition: the triggering 
conditions have been called so frequently that the selection of the course of action and its execution are 
virtually automatic.  In fact, for skill-based behavior such as walking or driving, the introduction of 
cognitive effort by the operator often increases the likelihood of error.10 
This taxonomy implies a focus area for any leader, but especially one in the Naval Construction Force.  
Because of the nature of Seabee operations, the best way for a leader to accomplish a given mission with 
even a modicum of complexity, that leader must exert cognitive effort so as to determine the proper 
distribution of tasks to different team members to maximize the use of skill-based behavior throughout 
the team.  Therefore, the leader must have detailed knowledge of both the tasks of that operation and the 
knowledge level/ experience/ performance levels of the team members. 
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1.1.1.2 Organizational Performance 
By definition, the goal of any engineered system is reliability.  An overarching goal of engineers must be 
to improve reliability.  However, interestingly enough, there is no single universally accepted cookbook 
recipe for achieving reliability despite years of research on the topic.  This work is rooted heavily in the 
research done by Professors Robert Bea and Karlene Roberts of UC Berkeley, so it is appropriate to touch 
briefly on their work regarding high reliability organizations since it provides much of the background for 
later analysis of Seabee operations.  Bea and Roberts define High Reliability Organizations (HRO) as 
those organizations that have operated nearly error free over long periods of time.11  These studies have 
compiled several common traits of HROs that are particularly relevant for this study.  Bea tells us that 
these common traits HROs that help reduce errors are: 
1. Command by exception or negation:  HRO management typically pushes authority to the lower levels 
of the organization and constantly monitors the behavior of subordinates.  The U.S. Navy refers to 
this as decentralizing authority to the lowest competent level of the hierarchy. 
2. Redundancy: HROs generally create backup systems of people, procedures and hardware that permit 
the main system to function when one of the components fails. 
3. Procedures and rules: HROs develop and implement procedures that are correct, accurate, complete, 
well organized, well documented and are not excessively complex. 
4. Training: While no two HROs have identical training programs, they all generally have programs that 
improve performance over a range: from normal to abnormal and on to “unbelievable” operations. 
5. Appropriate rewards and punishments:  HROs develop and implement systems of reward and 
punishment that are consistent with organization goals and create strong incentives to reduce errors.12 
Ability of management “to see the big picture”: HRO management is able to focus on big picture trends 
and situations and develop high reliability responses.  It is the author’s experience that much of this 
ability to see the big picture is created and enhanced by management’s migration of authority to lower 
levels of the hierarchy.  This allows upper management to focus limited cognitive resources on big picture 
trends and responses by leaving detailed decision-making to the system operators “on the deckplates” 
with the most expertise who are closest to the situation.13 
                                                 
11 ibid, pg 80 
12 ibid, pg 80 
13 ibid, pg 80 
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Bea cites the 1998 work of Weick Sutcliffe and Obstfeld when he tells us that HROs organizing in 
effective HROs is characterized by: 
1. Preoccupation with failure 
2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations 
3. Sensitivity to operations 
4. Commitment to resilience 
5. Under-specification of structures 
Roberts and Liguser (1993) analyzed five prominent failures including the Chrenobyl nuclear power 
plant, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, the Bhopal chemical plant gas leak, the mis-grinding of the 
Hubble Telescope mirror, and the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger.  This research yielded the 
following five hypotheses: 
1. Extensive process auditing procedures 
2. Reward systems that encourage risk mitigating behavior 
3. Quality standards that meet or exceed the referent standard 
4. Will correctly assess the risk associated with the given problem or situation 
5. Strong command and control system (as listed above) 
a. migrating decision making 
b. redundancy 
c. rules and procedures 
d. training 
e. Senior management has the big picture14 
                                                 
14 ibid, pg 80-82 
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2.1 Quality and Reliability Approaches 
While this academic work’s focus is to analyze the Human and Organizational Factors that influence 
Seabee construction, it is important to provide some background and definitions of terms.  One important 
aspect of this study is the modeling of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion as an “input/ output” 
system.  This model necessarily requires a crisp definition of this system, its input and output; which will 
be provided later in Chapter 5.  But prior to that, it is important to define these terms. 
2.1.1 Quality 
The term “quality” is so commonly used, that it remains poorly defined most of the time in everyday 
conversation.  However, this analysis requires an explicit definition of system quality.  We use the 
definition of quality that Bea provides: [Quality is] freedom from unanticipated defects.  Quality is fitness 
for purpose.  Quality is meeting the requirements of those that own, operate, design, construct and 
regulate engineered systems.  These requirements include those of serviceability, safety, compatibility 
and durability 
 
Figure 6: Quality Components of Engineered Systems 
As shown in the figure above15, quality has four sub-categories, which Bea defines in his work as well.  
Serviceability refers to the system’s suitability for the proposed purposes; the ability of the system’s use 
for its agreed purpose under the agreed conditions of use.  Safety is the freedom from excessive danger to 
human life, the environment, and property damage; the state of being free of undesirable and hazardous 
situations.  Compatibility assures that the system does not have unnecessary or excessive negative 
impacts on the environment and society during its life-cycle; the ability of the system to meet economic, 
QUALITY 
Ability to satisfy requirements
Serviceability 
Use for purpose 
for conditions 
Safety 
Acceptability of risks 
Compatibility 
Acceptability of impacts 
Durability
Freedom from unanticipated 
degradation 
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time and aesthetic requirements.  Durability assures that serviceability, safety and environmental 
compatibility are maintained during the intended life of the system.16  Durability adds the requisite 
dimension of time to the assessment of a system’s quality. 
2.1.2 Reliability and Robustness 
Now that we have a working definition of quality, we note that quality varies over time.  While durability 
defines the system’s degradation over time, it is not a complete description of the system’s performance 
over time.  Bea defines reliability as the probability (likelihood) that a given level of quality will be 
achieved during the design, construction and operating life-cycle phases of an engineered system.  
Reliability is the likelihood that the system will perform in an acceptable manner.17  This provides a 
somewhat more complete definition of quality. 
However, engineered systems do not operate in a vacuum.  Most systems operate in dynamic 
environments with unpredictable loading situations and damaging environments.  Therefore, the system 
operators must know how the system will respond to loading and damage.  Robustness is defined as a 
system’s ability to tolerate HOF originated defects and damage.  Bea and Aviguetero state that robustness 
relies upon three design strategies: 
· Configuration- the topology of the system elements, components and system provides back-ups in 
the primary load carrying paths 
· Ductility- the strain or deformation characteristics of the system elements, components and 
system are such that large inelastic deformations can be sustained without substantial losses in 
demand, load or stress carrying capacities. 
· Excess capacity- the demand, load or stress characteristics of the system elements, components, 
and system are such that when excessive demands are experienced due to unanticipated 
overloadings or redistribution of demands from other elements and components in the system, the 
systems is able to sustain these loadings and demands without undue distress.18 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 ibid, pg 7 
16 ibid, pg 7 
17 ibid, pg 12 
18 ibid, pg 17,18 
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3 Literature Review 
There is a significant body of knowledge regarding human and organizational factors.  There is also a 
whole host of instructions, directives, writing and academic research regarding construction in the Navy 
Seabees.  However, there is not a lot of direct intersection between the two.  Taken in total, all of this 
literature points to the same inevitable conclusion as this paper: human and organizational factors are the 
major controlling factor that determines quality in the construction effort of the Seabees.  Specifically, it 
can be concluded from this literature that the U.S. Navy puts a heavy premium on leadership.  As an 
organization, the Navy in general - and the Seabees in particular – values leadership as the primary 
pathway to ensuring quality in all of its systems. 
3.1 Existing Navy Instructions and Directives 
A thorough review of existing Navy instructions yields a whole host of guidance regarding leadership, 
training, billet selection, command culture and organization.  However, there are no doctrinal discussions 
specifically regarding HOF concepts.  In the early 1980s, the Navy had a program in its weapons systems 
acquisition program known as HARDMAN (Hardware/ Manpower Comparability Analysis 
Methodology) which combined analytical models to analyze: manpower, personnel, training, human 
factors engineering, system, safety, and health.19  However, in a recent Navy professional journal, former 
Secretary of the Navy Robert Pirie states that this program- while well intentioned and high-profile- did 
not accomplish much.  The design elements that this program created- total life-cycle cost savings, 
manpower reduction, system availability- all fell victim to cost cutting.20  The lesson learned here is that 
while the Navy as an organization values many of the human and organizational concepts introduced in 
this work, this value does not always “trickle down” to the operator level.  This work will attempt to 
alleviate this problem. 
Training: The US Navy view training as central to its success as a modern combat force.  There is an 
entire high echelon command organization whose sole focus is to run the Navy’s training program: the 
Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET).  As a central repository for training of all sorts, there are 
many instructions that CNET issues that document and govern the way that Seabees train.  All of the 
Navy’s central training manuals are issued by CNET, so the basis of much of the NCF’s leadership 
training is developed by CNET.  This leadership training focuses much attention on human and 
                                                 
19pg 14, “Instructional Decision Support Systems Applied to Aircrew and Biomedical Training” Journal of 
Courseware Engineering, Volume 1 
20 Pirie, “Really Put Humans First”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2002 
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organizational factors and is geared towards operations through all types of environments and situations: 
from peacetime to combat. 
3.2 Masters Theses 
This work is the latest in a long line of graduate research conducted by Navy Civil Engineer Corps 
officers at UC Berkeley.  The author finds himself “standing on the shoulders of giants” such as 
Commander Brant Pickrell, Lieutenant Commander Michael Saum, Lieutenant Shawn Cullen and 
Lieutenant Tim Liberatore; all of whom completed academic work on the impact of human and 
organizational factors on naval operations.  Their work focused on the HOFs that impact the Navy diving 
community and provided great insight to this work’s focus on the Seabee community. 
There has also been a fair amount of indirect discussion regarding HOFs written over the years by student 
officers at other universities.  Over the past 15 years, officers such as Commander Edouard Gonzales, 
Commander Mark Libonate, Lieutenant Robert Carr and others have all written academic theses/ major 
reports about Seabee operations during their tours at graduate school.  Recurring themes of this research 
are TQM, motivation and operational analysis.  This research has taken several different forms: from 
wide, sweeping generalist analyses to specific process improvement topics.  For example, Commander 
Mark Libonate wrote a well articulated piece of research regarding manpower availability factors when he 
was a Lieutenant studying at the University of Texas.  His detailed analysis of the way that Seabees 
calculated availability factors (in the project planning phase) resulted in a re-write of the two “bibles” for 
Seabee construction operations: The Operations Officer’s Handbook (COMTHIRDNCBINST 5200.2B) 
and The Seabee Planner and Estimators’ Handbook (NAVFAC P-405). 
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4 System Analysis Methods 
This work’s analysis of the NMCB Deployment Construction Program as an engineered system follows 
the process listed here: 
· Describe and define the NMCB system and its components.  The HOFs that manifest themselves 
in each component will also be described. 
· Literature review 
· System Description 
o Component analysis 
o Analysis of system approaches  
· Mixed Quantitative Analysis of NMCB Construction Operations 
This analysis will be used to help operators more fully understand the system and the HOFs that govern 
its quality output.  The analysis will also be used to recommend improvements to this engineered system. 
4.1 Analysis Guiding Principles  
It is important to note that there are several guiding principles that are fundamental to this analysis.  They 
are listed here: 
1. This project’s central premise is that Human and Organizational Factors have a major controlling 
influence on the readiness of the Seabees in a NMCB and on the quality of construction projects executed 
by the Naval Construction Force. 
2. As mentioned previously, a NMCB’s main mission is readiness.  Each battalion must be ready to 
perform its build/fight mission whenever called upon by the National Command Authority.  The 
“primary” way that battalions maintain their readiness is by executing this peacetime deployment 
construction program.  But in the “drudgery” of the daily routine, most of the system operators think that 
this construction program is the battalion’s main mission.  It is NOT the main mission; it is merely a 
means to accomplish the mission.  
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3. The main frame of reference of this analysis is the viewpoint of the Project Supervisor.  As mentioned 
earlier, this Seabee is the hinge pin around which the whole construction process revolves.  As such, this 
is an appropriate point of view from which to conduct this analysis. 
4. An underlying principle of the Navy’s career progression system is that the ultimate goal of any 
Seabee is command of troops.  As a result of this, the Naval Construction Force generalists who must see 
every aspect of Seabee operations from project management including supply chain management, 
construction inspection, safety program implementation, etc.  Another result of this principle is the 
military’s “up and out” promotion scheme which dictates that unless our Seabees get promoted (i.e. 
unless they do well in the pursuit of command) they are required to retire/ resign.  This combines to create 
a tremendous bias towards generalists.  This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does have impacts on the 
quality and reliability of the end-products of the system that this work is analyzing.   
5. This study’s recommendations are all formed with an eye towards searching for leverage points to 
take advantage of existing procedures and processes to enact change.  As a long-standing well-rooted 
organization which values culture and its rich heritage and traditions, change almost always happens in an 
evolutionary manner, not a revolutionary manner.  This analysis searches for leverage points to point this 
evolution in the right direction.  Thus, these recommendations are formulated based on existing 
definitions of procedures, interfaces, job assignments, etc. 
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5 Definition of System 
The system to be analyzed by this work is the U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Peacetime 
Deployment Construction Program.  The first step in this analysis is one of the most important: the 
development of a crisp, concise definition of this system.  It is equally important to define the quality 
attributes that describe this system and its end-products.  And finally, this system definition will list and 
describe the system’s output and its components.  Throughout this system definition, this work will 
highlight the HOFs that influence quality and performance. 
5.1 System Output: Ready Seabees and Shore Facilities. 
The most important product is a team of Seabees who are ready to build and fight in support of the US 
Marine Corps and other combat units as directed by the National Command Authority.  A by-product of 
this process is shore facilities for use by the US Navy and other federal government entities.  The system 
under analysis here is the NMCB’s peacetime construction training program as a readiness tool as shown 
in Figure 7. 
5.1.1 System Output Quality: Ready Seabees 
The first and most important output of this system is a team of Seabees who are ready to respond to 
emergencies and contingencies world-wide.  This quality output can be measured by examining the 
quality attributes of each system component as they relate to this system output: 
· Serviceability- Suitability of purpose means that the end product of this system is a cadre of 
Seabees who can build and fight.  Since the construction training program is the main tool used to 
improve their construction skills, it is important to ensure that this training does NOT degrade 
their military readiness - that is, we must not train solely for construction expertise at the expense 
of military readiness. 
· Durability- Personal health and welfare is the key to preventing unforeseen degradation. 
· Safety- This is the most important facet of quality as it relates to the creation of ready Seabees.  
As custodians of our nation's youth, it is incumbent upon the military to keep the safety of its 
sailors ever at the forefront. 

































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: NMCB System Input/ Output Diagram 
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· Compatibility- One primary focus area that most battalions adopt is the push to further the legacy 
of the Seabees by ensuring the satisfaction of their customers.  Seabee battalions are remarkably 
flexible construction organizations who can change to adapt to the ever-changing requirements of 
customers.  There are also other secondary compatibility issues regarding impact on host 
command’s fleet support mission.  Construction of quality construction support facilities does not 
make a happy customer if that customer cannot execute their primary fleet support mission 
because of construction impacts.  As operators, Seabees know full well the impact that their work 
can have on things like ship deployment schedules and flight operations.  They always take these 
issues into account because it is more important that a ship properly gets underway than it is to 
save a day’s worth of construction schedule. 
As with any other engineered system, an important aspect of its output quality is its robustness, its 
damage tolerance.  A Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, as a military combat unit, is designed to be a 
highly robust system.  A battalion has a whole host of support personnel and assigned equipment in order 
to ensure that they are self-sufficient: they have their own administrative staff, engineering staff, supply 
staff, heavy earth-moving equipment, small arms and ammunition, etc.  They also continuously train with 
an emphasis on mobility, flexibility, ability to gather and analyze intelligence and ability to exercise 
command and control. 
5.1.2 System Output Quality: Shore Facilities 
The other end product of the NMCB Construction Program is the shore facilities that are created by the 
construction projects.  The construction of these facilities is the training ground that develops the 
aforementioned ready Seabees, but these facilities are built for use by the host command.  These facilities 
share similar quality characteristics for construction in the private sector: 
· Serviceability- NMCBs ensure that the shore facilities they build are fit for the purpose that the 
host command intends for their use. 
· Durability- NMCBs have a comprehensive inspection program to ensure that the shore facilities 
they build do not degrade in unanticipated ways. 
· Safety- NMCBs ensure that the shore facilities they build are safe for their eventual owners and 
operators. 
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· Compatibility- NMCBs work closely with the host station’s environmental engineering staff to 
ensure that the shore facilities they build fully comply with all applicable environmental and land 
use regulations. 
The shore facilities that Seabees build during overseas also share similar robustness characteristics with 
construction in the private sector.  However, as explained further below, the robustness of Seabee 
construction probably suffers slightly because of the level of construction experience of the typical junior 
enlisted Seabee in various specialties, most notably paving and concrete block. 
However, this output is much more complex than the types of structures that Seabees build out in the field 
in combat conditions.  Under a concept known as the Advanced Base Functional Component System, 
standardized flexible modular infrastructure elements are pre-planned and pre-staged to simplify 
construction.  A large two volume database contains all of the information (including National Stock 
Number data for ordering) required to conduct planning of all levels of detail.  Within minutes, a team of 
two Seabees can create an order of magnitude estimate of material requirements, shipping requirements, 
manpower requirements and costs involved with creating complex facilities such as large tent camps and 
expeditionary airfields.  In fact, individual Seabees are required to go through this planning process as 
part of the qualification process to earn the title of Seabee Combat Warfare Specialist (as described later). 
5.2 System Components 
The NMCB Deployment Construction Program is a multi-faceted system with numerous components.  
The following description is a simplified model of this system that allows us to highlight the HOFs that 
operate in each component. 
5.2.1 System Input 
Host Naval Station:  The host Naval Station is not really a specific component of the system per se, but 
the end user (as part of the host station) is an integral part of the construction process. All NMCB 
construction is coordinated on behalf of the station by the station’s Public Works Officer (PWO).  The 
PWO is typically a senior Civil Engineer Corps Officer who serves as the “owner’s representative” for the 
station by working closely with the battalion to ensure things like job site traffic control and access, and 
liaison with final end user.  The other key player at the Host station is the Station Commanding Officer.  
As the Station Commanding Officer, he or she is responsible for providing logistic support for the 
NMCB.  Most of this is coordinated by the station PWO.  This all shows that the PWO is just as 
important a factor in ensuring the Compatibility attribute of quality as the direct system operators. 
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Engineering Field Division (EFD): The Navy’s prime agent for the management of all of its shore 
facilities is the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).  NAVFAC is a global command that 
employs thousands of federal service employees and military officers.  It is divided into four Divisions: 
Atlantic Division, Pacific Division, Southwest Division and South Division.  The geographical 
responsibility for each of these components of NAVFAC is listed in Appendix 2.  Within the framework 
of this system, they provide several key elements:  
· Design- Perform and/ or acquire designs, plans and specifications for all of the NMCB’s major 
tasked construction projects.  The cognizant EFD is responsible for proactive QA in the form of 
design QA/ QC that they conduct internally.  The EFD’s engineers also act as consultants on 
interactive and reactive QC measures taken by the NMCB construction crews and engineers. 
· A subordinate element of the EFD is the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC).  
These offices are located at every NMCB deployment site and act as external objective 
construction inspectors.  They are responsible for Quality Assurance and Quality Control. 
EFDs are a critical component of this system because they are managed and led by Civil Engineer Corps 
(CEC) Officers who also manage and lead the Naval Construction Force.  Most senior EFD leaders have 
been assigned to NCF units at least one time in their career.  In fact, assignment to the NCF is an 
important milestone in the professional development of all CEC officers for just this reason; it is crucial 
for EFD leadership to be able to “speak the Seabee language”. 
Chain of Command:  The final input to the NMCB Deployment Construction program is represented by 
their direct military chain of command.  There are two levels of the chain of command above a NMCB: 
the Naval Construction Division (NCD) and the Naval Construction Regiment (NCR).  This is shown in 
the following figure: 
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Figure 8: Naval Construction Force Chain of Command 
These two entities provide command and control (as defined below), logistics and training support as well 
as funding for material, equipment. 
FIRST Naval Construction Division:  The Naval Construction Division’s job is to provide administrative 
and operational command and control for NCF units within their purview.  It is important to note that this 
is not just limited to NMCBs.  The Division is also responsible for other NCF units such as Underwater 
Construction Teams (Seabee Divers), reserve Seabee units, Construction Battalion Units, etc.  Operational 
Control is defined as: authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving 
organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.21  Administrative 
Control is defined as: control over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and 
support, including organization of naval forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel 
management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and 
discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other 
organizations. Specifically included in [Administrative Control] are command of peacetime support 
and employment of NCF forces.22  1NCD’s mission then is to organize, train, operate and maintain the 
Naval Construction Force, to command and control echelon IV Naval Construction Force Commands, 
and to develop, coordinate and implement policy and requirements to man, equip and train Seabees. In 
exercising this mission, FIRST Naval Construction Division (1NCD) and Naval Construction Forces 
                                                 
21 pg 6,  “Naval Construction Force Policy” OPNAVINST 5450.46K, Enclosure (1) 
22 pg 7,  “Naval Construction Force Policy” OPNAVINST 5450.46K, Enclosure (1) 
Chief of Naval Operations 
US Operational Fleets 
US Atlantic Fleet/ US Pacific Fleet 
FIRST Naval Construction Division  
(1NCD) Little Creek, VA 
Naval Construction Regiments (NCR) Seabee Readiness Groups (SRG) 
22nd NCR: Atlantic Deployed NMCBs 
Camp Mitchell: Rota, Spain 
30th NCR: Pacific Deployed NMCBs 
Camp Shields: Japan/ Camp Covington: Guam 
Seabee Readiness Group Atlantic (SRGLANT) 
CBC Gulfport, MS 
Seabee Readiness Group, Pacific (SRGPAC) 
CBC Port Hueneme, CA 
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Command (NCFC) will provide combat construction forces to fulfill operational and forward engagement 
requirements of a Combatant or Component Commander; contingency and deliberate planning in support 
of OPLANs, training for Naval Construction Force units, and contributory construction support to Naval 
Shore Activities.23 
Naval Construction Regiment: The NCR's job is to provide administrative and operational command and 
control for NMCBs within their chain of command.  These regiments have an extensive staff that 
performs periodic review of NMCB operations; the staff is therefore loosely based around the same 
functions that the NMCBs accomplish.  These reviews take generally place during a battalion’s 
deployment and cover the entire range of operations including (but not limited to): project planning, 
equipment maintenance, financial and material management and administrative functions.  Deployed 
regiments also manage the initial stages of project development.  They receive project designs from the 
EFDs and do preliminary planning and estimating in order to effectively assign projects to the battalions 
Seabee Readiness Group:  These two commands (one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast) fulfill 
the NCD’s mandate of providing training, material and equipment to NMCBs to maintain their required 
levels of combat readiness.  They provide technical training and tactical training with their extensive 
classroom and laboratory facilities. 
5.2.2 System Components 
The Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Deployment Construction Program is a complex system.  This 
work admittedly greatly simplifies this system in order to analyze its quality attributes.  The following 
discussion describes the system components most critical to construction operations.   Figure 9 below 
shows a diagram of the different system components in a Seabee battalion and the significant sub-
components that govern quality. 
                                                 
23 pg 6, “Establishment Of First Naval Construction Division (1NCD)/ Naval Construction Forces Command 
(NCFC) and Modification of Atlantic And Pacific Naval Construction Forces (NCF)”,  OPNAV Notice 3111 
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Figure 9: System Components: NMCB Deployment Construction Program 
 
1.1.1.1 Structures  
There are several important structures that make up the NMCB Deployment Construction Program.  The 
most obvious of these structures is the tasked construction projects; i.e. the shore facilities that represent 
this system’s output.  This component will be examined in more detail later on in this work. 
Another system structure that has an influence on eventual system output quality is the battalion’s 
deployment site itself: the Seabee Camp.  As mentioned previously, there are three of these Camps: Camp 
Covington in Guam, Camp Mitchell in Spain and Camp Shields in Okinawa.  There is some variation in 
these camps, but overall, they are very similar.  Their operation and maintenance is assigned to the 
resident NMCB.  Bravo Company (staffed primarily with electricians and plumbers) are the main work 
force for camp maintenance.  The governing concepts of quality for these structures are similar to those 
for the projects.  As a matter of fact, there is often cross-assignment for Builders and Steelworkers 
between Bravo Company (tasked with ensuring quality of Camp structures) and Charlie Company (tasked 
with ensuring quality of system output- Construction Projects). 
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5.2.2.1 Hardware 
Seabees make great efforts to ensure they are properly equipped to safely accomplish their construction 
projects.  As mentioned previously, material readiness is an important aspect of the battalion’s “readiness 
report card”.  Two main types of hardware that are managed carefully are Civil Engineer Support 
Equipment (CESE) and tools.  CESE is a resource-intensive component of hardware (from a funding 
standpoint as well as a personnel standpoint) so CESE management receives much attention from the 
chain of command.  The governing instruction is titled Management of Civil Engineer Support Equipment 
(COMSECONDNCB/ COMTHIRDNCBINST 11200.1A, 09 June 1998) which outlines a rigorous 
maintenance and inspection program.  CESE Maintenance is such a big and complex program that it 
could be analyzed as its own sub-system.  The other main type of hardware in this system is tools.  The 
NCF has an involved system of tool inventory and maintenance that is governed by the Seabee Supply 
Manual (COMSECONDNCB/ COMTHIRDNCBINST 4400.3, 11 November 1998). 
5.2.2.2 Interfaces 
In a system as complex and flexible as a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, there are countless 
interfaces between components.  This work will not attempt to list them all but will describe how the 
system manages these interfaces.  The cultural dichotomy between the officer community and the enlisted 
community forms a split between the operators of this system and how they focus their cognitive efforts.  
Enlisted Seabees- as the hands-on operators of this system- focus their attention and their efforts on their 
own component and their own activity.  Officers- and to some extent senior enlisted Chief Petty Officers- 
are the forward-thinking big picture operators of this system.  As such, officers focus as much of their 
attention on the interfaces of this system as they do on the individual components. 
5.2.2.3 Organizations  
Each NMCB has the same nominal organizational structure.  This structure is shown in the figure below 
and is based on the structure of a typical US Marine Corps infantry unit.  NMCBs tend to task organize in 
order to properly match resources (people) with missions.  These task-specific organizations are 
addressed later under the heading of Procedures. 




Note: A list of Navy ranks and pay-grades is included in Appendix 3 as a reference 
The operators of this system are the individual sailors of the battalion.  This is the most important 
component of this system and is graphically shown above24.  Every member of the command is involved 
in this system in some way, but this work will list certain important groups of these operators: 
· Command Element- The command element is composed of the Commanding Officer (CO), 
Executive Officer (XO) and the Staff Officers (S-codes as listed above).  The Commanding 
Officer and the Executive Officer are senior officers in the Civil Engineer Corps (Commander 
and Lieutenant Commander respectively) and are the two top members of the battalion’s internal 
chain of command.  The Commanding Officer is solely responsible for the quality and reliability 
of the system’s output and allocates the resources and point the battalion in the right direction to 
ensure quality output.  The Executive Officer is the second in command and acts as the Chief 
Staff Officer.  He or she makes sure the battalion’s staff is functioning properly and pointed 
                                                 
24 pg I-10, Operations Officer Handbook COMSECONDNCB/ COMTHRIDNCBINST 5200.2B Enclosure (1) 
Figure 10: Nominal Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Organization 
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towards mission accomplishment and quality output.  The Staff Officers accept the guidance of 
the CO and the XO and make it happen. 
· Operations Department.  The Operations Department could easily be renamed the Quality 
Department in light of the concepts presented in this work.  According to doctrine, the Operations 
Officer (as head of this department) has functional authority over the construction and disaster 
preparedness programs in the battalion.25  In practice, this department is really responsible for all 
aspects of quality for the battalion: they exercise this functional authority to ensure quality of all 
system output.  There are several important system operators in this department: 
o Operations Officer and Operations Chief: These two Seabees lead and manage this diverse 
organization.  The Operations Officer is typically a CEC Lieutenant Commander and often 
has had a previous tour in the Seabees.  The Operations Chief is typically a Master Chief 
Petty Officer in the Navy with more than 20 years of experience in the Seabees. 
o Assistant Operations Officer: This Seabee is typically a junior officer in the CEC whose 
primary task is to report the battalion’s readiness to higher headquarters.  He or she gathers 
information from the entire system, analyzes it for trends and cues, and translates it into the 
correct message format to formally report on the battalion’s readiness. 
o Quality Control Chief:  This Seabee is typically a Navy Chief Petty Officer with at least 
between 8 and 15 years of experience who is in charge of managing the battalion’s QC 
program.  In light of the material presented in this work, this program is as much a Quality 
Assurance effort as it is Quality Control.  This program will be discussed in further detail 
later on in this work.  The QC Chief also has a team of three QC inspectors to act as the 
“eyes, ears and nose” of the QC Division.  These QC inspectors represent each of the 
functional vertical construction trades (structural, electrical and mechanical) and are normally 
“front-runners” in the battalion with proven technical expertise. 
o Safety Officer: This Seabee is typically a Navy Chief Petty Officer with at least between 12 
and 17 years of experience who manages and leads the battalion’s Safety Program.  This 
program will also be discussed in further detail later on in this work. 
o Engineering Officer: This Seabee is typically a junior officer in the CEC who is in charge of 
the system’s internal engineering analysis team.  The Engineering Officer leads a team of 
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Engineering Aides (technicians) as they conduct materials testing, surveying and limited 
design work in support of construction projects.  This team is an important part of the system 
to ensure durability and serviceability of the final construction products. 
· Prime Company Project Management- Project management organization is overlaid on top of the 
nominal battalion “infantry company” organization.  A visual representation of this organization 
is shown below26:  
 
This task-organization contains the most critical operators of this system: 
o Project Supervisor- This Seabee is the prime operator in this analysis.  He or she is generally 
a First Class Petty Officer with between 4-10 years of experience who is individually 
responsible for all quality attributes of a given construction project.  The Project Supervisor is 
senior enough in the chain of command to exert a wide range of authority throughout the unit, 
but is junior enough to have close, detailed knowledge of day to day site operations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 pg 2-2, NAVEDTRA 12543: Naval Construction Force 1 & C 
26 pg I-13, Operations Officer Handbook COMSECONDNCB/ COMTHRIDNCBINST 5200.2B Enclosure (1) 
Figure 11: Nominal Company Project Organization 
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o Project Crew Leader- Site operations are directed by the Project Crew Leader who is the 
Supervisor’s principle subordinate.  This Seabees is typically a Second Class Petty Officer 
with 2-5 years of experience and does exactly what the title implies: leads and manages the 
project crew. 
o Project Safety Supervisor- The principal subordinate of the Crew Leader is the Project Safety 
Supervisor.  This Seabee has anywhere between 1 – 5 years of experience and is responsible 
for planning and implementing the project’s Safety Plan. 
o Company Commander- This Seabee is a CEC junior officer who is the singularly responsible 
for all quality attributes of both system outputs as they apply to his or her company.  The 
Company Commander is responsible for the readiness of the Seabees of the company and is 
the primary “project engineer” for all construction projects assigned to the company.  As 
such, the Company Commander analyzes project progress to see big picture trends in the 
construction quality and the readiness of the project crews.  An unfortunate by-product of the 
professional development process in the Navy’s Civil Engineer Corps is the wide range of 
experience and training levels of company commanders.  They range from newly 
commissioned Ensigns with less than a year of active duty service to older, limited duty 
officers who have risen up through the enlisted ranks and have up to 15 years of experience.  
Additionally, Company Commanders have a wide range of academic backgrounds: some are 
trained civil engineers, some are engineers in other disciplines, and some (LDOs) have no 
baccalaureate engineering education at all.  This variance puts a real premium on the 
selection and training of the company commander’s direct supervisor and direct subordinate: 
the Operations Officer and the Company Chief. 
o Company Chief- This Seabees is typically a Senior Chief Petty Officer or Chief Petty Officer 
who has anywhere between 10 and 20 years of experience.  As the principal assistant to the 
Company Commander, this Seabee is responsible for the primary output of this system: to 
ensure that the Seabees of the company maintain their readiness.  As such, this Seabee 
generally focuses on the “people programs” of the system. 
o Company Operations Chief- This Seabee is typically a Chief Petty Officer or Senior Chief 
Petty Officer with anywhere between 8 and 17 years of experience.  The Ops Chief is 
singularly responsible for the quality and reliability of the other system output: the 
construction projects. 
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o Projects Chief- This Seabee is typically a Chief Petty Officer with between 8 and 14 years of 
experience.  He or she is the primary advisor for the Project Supervisor and brings experience 
and authority to the table. 
· Project Support Operators- There is a whole host of other system operators in the battalion who 
play an important role in construction quality.  Some of the key ones are listed below: 
o Alfa Company – Alfa Company Seabees operate and maintain the battalion’s entire suite of 
Civil Engineer Support Equipment (CESE…heavy equipment).  They schedule and operate 
all CESE resources to maximize support to all ongoing projects.  Equipment readiness is the 
single largest financial investment of the battalion so Alfa Company’s performance is an 
important factor in the battalion’s material readiness.  Incidentally, Alfa Company is also 
assigned projects that are primarily horizontal construction jobs so they also task-organize in 
a project management structure as mentioned above.  There are some potential training and 
selection issues here because the Equipment Operators and Construction Mechanics do not 
typically manage projects as part of their normal career progression in the CESE support 
aspect of NCF operations.  So occasionally, their experience in project management is 
limited. 
o Bravo Company – Bravo Company Seabees are responsible for the utilities maintenance and 
Seabee Camp maintenance for the battalion.  They are responsible for operating and 
maintaining the system structures as listed above.  Since they have most of the battalion’s 
Construction Electricians and Utilitiesman (plumbers), they are an important source of 
technical experience for all project crews.  As with Alfa Company, they are also assigned 
project management duties for projects that are utilities intensive (underground pipe 
installation, etc.).  They have the same types of training and selection issues that Alfa 
Company project managers have. 
o Supply Department- The Supply Department is a multi-faceted team of Seabees who are 
tasked with the management of all material resources of the battalion.  As such, their 
management effort is a crucial factor in the battalion’s material readiness.  An important part 
of the Supply Department is the Material Liaison Office (MLO).  This team is t typically 
comprised of Seabees from construction trades who are responsible for ordering, inventory, 
storing and issuing construction material for all of the system’s construction projects.  As 
construction trade Seabees, they have intimate knowledge of the material as it travels through 
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their area of responsibility.  But sometimes they do not have the same skill in managing and 
inventorying material that other sailors who are trained as storekeepers might have. 
o Training Department- The Training Department is another team of Seabees who have an 
important mission that directly supports the battalion’s readiness.  They are responsible for 
managing the battalion’s Training Program which identifies required skills and ensures that 
the battalion has the correct amount of Seabees and teams who have these skills.  This is 
training attainment is an important criteria in measuring the battalion’s overall readiness.  
Additionally, as a result of the Seabees’ “Build and Fight” mission, the Training Department 
must arrange both tactical combat training and technical training for all system operators.  
There are numerous tradeoffs between that they must address between conducting these two 
types of training because of limited resources of time, classroom space and instructors. 
5.2.2.5 Environments 
Seabees have to be able to operate in a wide range of environments- known as Projected Operating 
Environments- as mentioned above and listed in Appendix 1.  This wide range requires Seabees and their 
equipment to be remarkably flexible.  To cite a specific example, this is why a NMCB Table of 
Allowance does not contain any sheep’s-foot rollers.  While such rollers are extremely effective for 
compaction of clayey soil, they are a real liability in a combat contingency operation because of the 
difficulty involved in transporting them.  If such a piece of equipment is absolutely required, the end user 
is forced to rent it (which has compatibility impacts on the project budget).  This is just one example of 
how POEs impact the quality of construction projects. 
5.2.2.6 Procedures 
There are countless processes and procedures that govern quality and reliability in the NMCB 
Deployment Construction Program.  This work will list several of the important ones: 
1. Safety and Risk Management (ORM and NAVOSH) 
2. Project Management (Planning and Execution) 
3. Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
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Procedure 1) Safety and Risk Management 
As with any military organization, safety is the first and foremost consideration of all hands.  This falls 
right in line with this system’s primary output: a team of ready Seabees.  Therefore, Safety is the 
primary quality attribute of this system.  Safety in the Naval Construction Force is guided by two 
general Navy instructions: Operational Risk Management OPNAVINST 3500.39 and the Navy 
Occupational Safety and Health (NAVOSH) Manual OPNAVINST 5100.23E. 
Operational Risk Management 
The formalized process that the Naval Construction Force follows to ensure safety is known as 
Operational Risk Management (ORM).  It is defined as a program that: 
1. [is] a decision making tool used by people at all levels to increase operational effectiveness-by 
anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for loss, thereby increasing the probability of a 
successful mission. 
2. increases our ability to make informed decisions by providing the best baseline of knowledge and 
experience available. 
3. minimizes risks to acceptable levels, commensurate with mission accomplishment. The amount 
of risk we will take in war is much greater than that we should be willing to take in peace, but the 
process is the same. Applying the Operational Risk Management process will reduce mishaps, 
lower costs, and provide for more efficient use of resources.27 
This comprehensive RAM approach has been the Navy’s standard since 1996 when OPNAVINST 
3500.39 was released.  ORM was actually a program that was developed by the U.S. Army who has 
operated by this system for years.  ORM is primarily a proactive approach, but the implementation of the 
program demands reactive and interactive approaches. 
NCF implementation of ORM 
Construction is one of the most hazardous routine activities in Navy operations, so safety has been a 
primary focus of the NCF since its inception in 1942.  One of the most important parts of project planning 
is the development of a comprehensive Project Safety Plans.  This plan is fully integrated into the project 
execution plan: as each construction activity is developed, ORM concepts are applied to identify potential 
                                                 
27 pg 1, OPNAVINST 3500.39 Enclosure (1) 
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hazards involved with the activity, determine the likelihoods and severity of those hazards, and find ways 
to minimize those risks.  So each construction activity has an ORM worksheet associated with it.  This 
program is managed on a job site by the Project Safety Supervisor.  This proactive approach is a good 
way to encourage the Project Crew Leader and Project Supervisor to look ahead to prevent safety hazards 
and remain focused on safety. 
NMCB Safety Program: NAVOSH 
The NMCB Safety Program is set up as instructed in the NAVOSH Manual mentioned above.  It is a 
multi-faceted RAM program that uses all three approaches to ensure operator safety: Proactive, Reactive 
and Interactive.  There are several aspects of this program that are important to discuss. 
Safety Inspections- the Safety Officer and the Assistant Safety Officer conduct daily inspections of every 
job site.  Using a specific inspection form (shown in Appendix 4) they monitor each job site with an eye 
towards compliance with the project’s own safety plan. 
Mishap Investigations- the Safety Chief oversees all mishap investigations.  Mishaps are conducted on all 
mishaps- whether or not they took place on duty or on liberty.  Each battalion uses its own mishap 
investigations form, but these forms are all collected and analyzed by the Safety Chief.  
An important part of the NMCB Safety Program is its two tiered implementation and management 
system: There are two command-wide safety teams: the NAVOSH Policy Council and the NAVOSH 
Committee.  The NAVOSH Policy Council is chaired by the XO and is composed of the Safety Officer 
(as a non-voting recorder), all Company Commanders and all Department Heads.  This upper echelon 
team analyzes safety data gathered by the Safety Officer to enact policy changes in all aspects of battalion 
operations to ensure that safety remains a constant focus.  The NAVOSH Committee consists of Project 
Safety Supervisors from each ongoing construction project and Safety Representatives from each 
department.  This working level team takes a close look at each reported mishap as well as the daily 
safety inspection forms to try to find trends.  This team also determines the best way to implement the 
guidance and policy directives that are issued by the NAVOSH Safety Policy Council.  The advantage 
that both of these teams have is that they are attended by representatives from the entire battalion so they 
take an inter-disciplinary approach. 
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Procedure 2) Project Management 
Seabee Project Management takes place in much the same way as it does in the private sector.  This 
process is focused primarily on quality of the end product (construction).  Before projects get to the 
battalion, they follow a generalized process: 
· Develop requirements- End users determine the requirement for construction service.  They start 
the process to acquire a design. 
· Design development- End users work closely with their cognizant EFD and NCB to develop a 
design that meets their needs and provides good training for the Seabees.  The EFD either 
completes the design in-house with their own engineers or they out-source and purchase a design 
from a civilian architect/ engineering (A/E) firm. 
· NCB and NCR- After the design is complete, the NCB and the NCR evaluate the project and 
schedule it for NMCB accomplishment based primarily on the urgency expressed by the end user. 
After the project is tasked to a battalion, there is a specific process that this system follows to get the 
project going.  It can be split into two phases: project planning and project execution: 
Project Planning 
The NCF views project planning as an important tool to make groom young Seabees for future 
professional growth.  The planning process helps young Seabees understand the big picture and develops 
their ability to manage complex processes.  It represents an important proactive approach to reduce HOE.  
The planning process also creates an important (and under-utilized) project management tool: the three 
level project schedule. 
Planning and Estimating (P&E) is the heart of this planning process.  P&E is a proactive approach to 
prudent resource management.  Project Supervisors and Crew Leaders sit down at least six months before 
the deployment to review the designs and come up with a plan to manage the project’s resources.  The 
main reference they use as they develop this plan is NAVFAC P-405: the Crewleaders’ Handbook.  This 
manual contains nominal tabular data that helps them predict usage of the various resources at their 
disposal: 
· Time: The prime end product of the P&E process is a three-level project schedule.  The P&E 
team uses the CPM approach to break up the project into discrete construction activities.  
Durations and sequences are developed for these activities, which determines the overall project 
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schedule.  The P-405 lists numerous standard construction activities (much like the Means’ 
Construction Data tables) as a reference for these durations. 
· Crew size: The P&E team also manages the Seabees that they are assigned.  Based on the 
construction activities developed (and data from the P-405) the P&E team determines how many 
Seabees they will need and what trades they must have. 
· Material: The P&E team determines all the material and equipment they will need to complete the 
project on a construction activity basis.  CESE, tools, and construction material estimates are all 
calculated for each activity. 
· Safety Plan: The P&E team also develops the Project Safety Plan.  As mentioned above, it is 
based on an individual construction activity basis. 
The P&E team works on this plan throughout most of the homeport training period leading up to the 
deployment.  There is a specific plan of action and milestones (POA&M) that the Crewleaders’ Handbook 
lays out to help the P&E team develop their plan in time for the deployment.  As the team hits each 
milestone, they submit their plan up the chain of command for review and approval.  This is an effective 
interactive QA/QC approach but is unfortunately under-utilized.  Because of busy schedules, this “review 
and approval” often becomes a “check-in-the-box” activity with little review.  The Operations 
Department is required to report their progress on each project in relation to this POA&M on a monthly 
basis to higher headquarters at the NCR. 
Project Execution  
Once the plan is complete and approved, the schedule of construction activities becomes the primary 
project management tool that the Project Supervisor and Project Crew Leader use to manage and employ 
their resources.  This schedule is visually displayed on a Gantt chart.  The entire schedule is split into 
three levels: 
· Level I:  This is a battalion wide schedule that lists each project as a separate line item. 
· Level II: This is a more detailed schedule used by the Operations Officer and the Company 
Commander.  Each project has a Level II schedule associated with it and has Master Activities 
(that group individual construction activities) listed as individual line items. 
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· Level III: This is the most detailed schedule format and is used by the Project Supervisor and 
Project Crew Leader.  Each project has a Level III schedule which lists each individual 
construction activity. 
Samples of these schedules are included in Appendix 5. 
Procedure 3) Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
The Naval Construction Force’s Quality Control Program is outlined in great detail in a lengthy 
instruction: Construction Quality Control Program (COMSECONDNCB/ COMTHIRDNCBINST 
4355.1D, July 1998).  The title is somewhat misleading because this program is really a QA/ QC program 
that takes proactive, reactive and interactive approaches to improve quality in NCF construction projects.  
The program focuses around two timeframes: Planning (prior to construction activity) and Inspection 
(during execution of construction activity).  The Construction Quality Program refers to these phases as 
“control” and “inspection”.  “Control” in this reference is used to describe to preventive proactive 
measures and “Inspection” refers to interactive and reactive measures. 
Quality Control Plans- NMCB QC Plans are two-sided.  Each Planning and Estimating Team is required 
to develop a QC plan for their project that defines specific quality measures for each construction activity.  
The battalion QC staff also develops a QC Inspection Plan based on this QC plan to ensure that these 
quality measures are met.  This proactive approach encourages both teams (Project Crews and QC 
inspectors) to use teamwork to work together to reduce HOE. 
QC Inspections- NMCB QC Inspections are really a mix of interactive and reactive approaches to reduce 
errors.  The general process is as follows: 
· Pre-construction Conference- The QC staff meets with the Project Supervisor, Company 
Commander, Operations Officer, ROICC inspectors and end-users before construction begins.  
This meeting is designed to encourage communication and make sure that everyone is informed 
of the schedule and specific concerns.  While this is not necessarily a phase of construction, it sets 
the stage for later interactive approaches by building relationships between the key players. 
· Preparatory Phase- Project Crew Leaders and QC inspectors conduct meetings during the 
Preparatory Phase that occurs before the commencement of each construction activity.  This 
meeting ensures that the crews and the inspectors all know what the relevant quality attributes 
and specifications are for that activity.  This is the last proactive approach. 
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· Initial Phase- QC Inspectors observe the start of the construction activity to ensure that design 
plans and specifications as discussed during the preparatory phase are being followed. 
· Follow-up Phase- QC Inspectors conduct daily inspections to observe construction progress to 
verify that all quality attributes were met.  This phase is highly interactive as the QC Inspectors- 
as experienced construction technicians- work closely with project crews to reduce errors and 
ensure quality.  A sample of the daily inspection form is included in Appendix 6. 
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6  System Human and Organizational Factors 
There are several overarching HOFs that manifest themselves in several of this system’s components and 
approaches.  These factors have deep and lasting effects on both the readiness of the Seabees and the 
quality of the facilities that they build. 
6.1 NMCBs as High Reliability Organizations 
Dr. Robert Bea defines High Reliability Organizations as: organizations that have operated nearly error 
free over long periods of time (pg 80).  Any analysis of a technical organization is complemented by a 
comparative look at High Reliability Organizations; especially an analysis of a dynamic organization like 
a Seabee battalion that routinely conducts hazardous operations in austere environments.  Chapter 2 of 
this work provides some background regarding the existing research done on these organizations. 
But how do these concepts apply to NMCBs?  After all, the construction process is so complex, that it 
seems difficult to crisply classify a Seabee battalion as a High Reliability Organization (or any 
construction organization for that matter).  But it is this author’s opinion that Seabee battalions do exhibit 
many of the characteristics that distinguish HROs.  Further, Seabee battalions often exhibit many of these 
characteristics that their civilian counterparts do not, thanks mostly to their military requirements.  Here is 
a list of HRO characteristics (as listed above) that apply in particular to the US Naval Construction Force: 
1. Extensive process auditing procedures:  There are several process auditing procedures in every 
aspect of NMCB operations.  While too numerous to list here, it is important to note that these procedures 
are not only published, but enforced by periodic inspections.  Each NMCB gets inspected at least twice in 
a typical homeport-deployment cycle: once in homeport to determine their readiness to deploy and once 
at an early stage in the deployment to set the expectations for that deployment.  These inspections are 
large evolutions where  
2. Reward systems that encourage risk mitigating behavior:  Each battalion has different individual 
reward systems, but most units informally reward risk mitigating behavior.  As described earlier, personal 
professional reputation is the main currency by which Seabees are compensated; it is relatively easy to 
encourage risk mitigating behavior by simply valuing such behavior (which we do) and publishing 
congratulatory news about such behavior. 
3. Quality standards that meet or exceed the referent standard:  In everyday construction 
operations, there are reams of standards that must be followed for any given construction activity: no less 
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than 3 inches of spacing between reinforcing steel and concrete forms, 40 day maintenance cycles for 
construction equipment, etc.  Seabees realize that their construction operations take place in vastly 
different situations than the “industry standard” (i.e. civilian construction practice).  Therefore, most- if 
not all- Seabee instructions out in the field are written with safety factors above and beyond the “industry 
standard”. 
4. Will correctly assess the risk associated with the given problem or situation:  Collected mishap 
data over fiscal year 2001 reveals that most battalions in the Pacific theater do a reasonably good job of 
assessing risk on the job sites.  Most of the safety mishaps (between 65% - 75%) occur off duty.  Further, 
most (78%) of the mishaps that do occur, result in either no lost time (51%) or in light duty (27% where 
the member returns to work but with diminished capacity).28 
5. Strong command and control system:  As a military combat unit, Seabees have tremendously 
strong command and control systems.  They are able to draw upon the best practices of the US Marine 
Corps, the US Navy and other world class leadership outfits. 
a. Migrating decision making.  The US armed forces have long understood the requirement to push 
decision making authority down to the lowest level of the hierarchy capable of making good decisions. 
The reason why military discipline and unit esprit-de-corps is so valued in the US military is because 
these two qualities enable leaders to successfully delegate decisions to the lowest competent level.  
b. Redundancy.  Seabee doctrine and policy is designed to demand redundancy in manning levels, 
training attainment and equipment and material inventories as outlined explicitly in classified readiness 
documents.  There are only a few quantities that are allowed to be unique in the battalion and those are 
either not mission-critical such as the lone Chaplain assigned to the battalion or are easily replaceable 
with other organic assets. 
c. Rules and procedures.  There are literally reams of rules and procedures that are followed in the 
complex day to day operations of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion.  These are complete and 
comprehensive, but also are flexible enough to afford individual system operators authority to make 
decisions.  In order to make sense of these rules and procedures, they are codified and simplified into 
standard operating procedures that can be easily posted in work spaces for clarity. 
d. Training.  The entire deployment cycle is one large training evolution designed to exercise 
command and control in a dynamic environment and sharpen technical construction skills.  This aspect of 
                                                 
28 pg 3, 3NCB FY01 Safety Mishap Analysis, SWCS M. Widener 
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training- because it involves real construction that is much more complex than anything Seabees might 
have to build out in an expeditionary combat zone- goes through the entire spectrum from normal, to 
abnormal and on to unbelievable.  Seabee battalions also conduct full scale battalion-wide real-time 
training exercises out in the field each homeport.  These field exercises are driven by tactical scenarios 
that tax the full range of the battalion’s command and control capability as well as the military field and 
combat skills of its individual Seabees and its subordinate task-organized units. 
e. Senior management has the big picture.  Again, military culture serves to re-enforce the 
requirement for senior management to keep hold of the big picture.  By delegating decisions to the lowest 
competent level, senior management “conserves” cognitive resources to focus them on big picture issues. 
6.2 Selection: Career Path (Promotion, selection and command) 
Training and Selection are crucial ingredients in the Naval Construction Force’s recipe for quality.  
Battalions each take great pains to ensure it selects the right system operators to optimize quality.  After 
selecting these operators, the NCF ensures they get as much training as they can to succeed in their 
respective job assignments. 
6.2.1 Navy Accession and Promotion Policy 
The Navy follows a very specific, regulated recruitment and promotion system for both officer and 
enlisted personnel.  These two systems are a fundamental aspect of the Navy’s organizational fabric, so 
any discussion about the Navy’s leadership and organizational factors must take a close look at this 
system.  In particular, the promotion system also has significant influences on the levels of technical 
expertise and experience that its operators have. 
6.2.1.1 Officer promotion 
Officers in the US Navy serve at the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces; by 
earning a commission in the US Navy, they are accorded certain rights and privileges.  Unlike enlisted 
personnel, officers in the US Navy with active duty commissions are not signed on for contracts of 
limited durations.  Officers are signed on for permanent commissions and serve in the Navy until they 
voluntarily resign to return to civilian life (or are involuntarily removed for cause). 
Promotion is a more complicated procedure.  Promotion to each successive rank is determined by an 
officer’s professional performance record.  For the first promotion to Lieutenant (Junior Grade), the Navy 
currently promotes all qualified officers.  For all other promotions, the Navy convenes a board of officers 
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each year to review records in order to determine which officers will be promoted that year.  This board 
reviews the records of all officers who are eligible for promotion that year and are given a number of 
officers that they can select.  This number is based on the current numbers of officers at the next higher 
rank and projects of attrition and retirement.  This board is given a set of instructions called “precepts” 
that guide their decision-making process.  It tells the board members what standards they should use when 
determining which officers are best qualified for promotion. 
But upon what principles are these precepts based?  The core determining factor is an officer’s 
preparation for command of operational units.  Officers are continually reminded throughout their careers 
that command at sea should be their ultimate goal.  This policy is shown clearly in the following excerpt 
from the most recent precept for the promotion board for Civil Engineer Corps Lieutenant Commanders: 
Naval policy regarding application of the statutory best qualified standard is as follows: The 
needs of the navy dictate that our future leaders possess the qualities to excel in combat as 
commanders or in support of operational commanders or positions of leadership in direct support 
of fleet operations.  Proven excellence in operational environments is an important measure of the 
qualities required.  Performance while in command (for those who have been afforded the 
opportunity), as well as potential for command is the ultimate test of fitness for promotion.  
Officers may have also demonstrated leadership, skill, integrity, and resourcefulness in other 
difficult and challenging joint and in-service assignments.29 
But fortunately for the Naval Construction Force, NMCBs are among the few opportunities for 
operational experience.  Therefore, previous experience in Seabee battalions can have a strong bearing on 
a CEC officer’s chances for promotion.  This can only help the Naval Construction Force by helping to 
ensure that senior officers in the CEC can be strong advocates for Seabees because “they’ve been there 
and done that”.  This also helps the NCF because their clients are often senior CEC officers themselves: 
Public Works Officers at forward overseas naval installations, etc.  These senior CEC officers have 
typically been in Seabee battalions themselves in the past so they know the operating methods, strengths 
and limitations of the NCF. 
                                                 
29  Appendix B, Secretary of the Navy letter to RADM Charles R. Kubic, CEC, USN,  29 April 2002, PRECEPT 
CONVENING FY-03 PROMOTION SELECTION BOARD TO CONSIDER OFFICERS IN THE CIVIL 
ENGINEER CORPS ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OF THE NAVY FOR PROMOTION TO THE 
PERMANENT GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER 
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6.2.1.2 Enlisted promotion 
Enlisted promotion follows the same general concepts as officer promotion, but is managed under 
separate, distinct processes.  Enlisted troops- as discussed above- sign definitive, finite contracts of 
service ranging in length from 3-6 years.  Therefore, each time an enlisted Seabee’s contract ends, he or 
she is faced with a big decision: whether or not to re-enlist.  These career milestones offer the Navy an 
opportunity to create powerful incentives such as re-enlistment bonuses and re-enlistment ceremonies (to 
recognize the service member’s renewed commitment).  However, this human resource management 
model also creates a much more complicated personnel accounting system because it is not connected to 
payroll or crew-lists.  In fact, one of the biggest tasks for a company staff in a Seabee battalion is juggling 
and updating various disparate personnel accounting systems: battalion manning, jobsite crew lists, daily 
attendance sheets, and payroll. 
Another feature of the enlisted promotion process is that it values generalists.  In order to be a Project 
Supervisor, a QC Inspector or a Safety Inspector, a Seabee should serve as a Project Crew Leader.  In 
order to serve as a Crew Leader, a Seabee should serve as a Crew Member.  But in the NCF, the 
timeframes created by typical battalion tours and their deployment schedules demands a rapid 
advancement in job assignments.  Therefore, Seabees typically only spend one deployment in a given job 
before they move up.  In the civilian world, journeymen and craftsmen often spend years perfecting their 
trade.  Seabees cannot match this experience, which means that their activity on the jobsite is almost 
always knowledge based behavior.  Their civilian counterparts can often advance to the point where much 
of their activity is rule based or even skill based. 
6.2.2 Company Commanders 
Company structure in the NCF is based on the standard Marine Corps rifle company structure.  This 
structure has been developed from years of combat infantry experience and expertly leverages talent, 
experience, authority and responsibility.  However, there are some complications as this organizational 
template gets transferred to the Naval Construction Force.  In the typical Marine Corps rifle company 
structure, there are more officers.  Each Marine Corps platoon is commanded by a 2LT or a 1LT 
(equivalent to a Navy ENS or LTJG.  See Appendix 3 for rank structure).  The typical Marine Corps 
Company Commander is a Captain (equivalent to a Navy LT).  However, in the Seabees, there are not 
enough junior officers to put one in command of each platoon.  Therefore, Platoon Commanders in 
Seabee battalions are always Chief Petty Officers or even First Class Petty Officers.  This puts a premium 
on enlisted leadership.  It also pushes day to day management authority of the jobsite away from 
engineers (officers) and more towards technicians (Chief Petty Officers). 
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6.3 Training 
This work would not be complete without outlining the training processes that the system operators go 
through.  It highlights some specific HOFs that come into play in NCF operations. 
6.3.1 Enlisted training 
There is a core training pipeline that all enlisted Seabees go through.  It begins with Boot Camp and A-
School which they go through in the same way that every other sailor in the US Navy does.  After the 
enlisted Seabees report to their battalion, their training continues to prepare them for their specific duties 
for upcoming deployments. 
· Boot Camp- Entry recruit training for all Seabees is the same as it is for every other Sailor in the US 
Navy.  It is a rigorous eight week training program that introduces civilians to life in the military.  It 
includes physical training, military bearing, and technical training all in an environment of intense 
discipline. 
· A School.  After Boot Camp, most Seabees move on to initial technical training for their specific 
military occupational specialty, which is known as A-school.  The Department of Defense recently 
consolidated training for all construction related occupational specialties in all of the armed services.  
Now, Builders from the Navy, the Air Force and the Army all train together after completing boot 
camp. 
· Special Construction Battalion Training (SCBT).  The construction projects that a battalion accepts 
necessitate a whole host of specific technical training: welding, concrete finishing, block laying, etc.  
The Seabee Readiness Groups offer a wide range of these classes for battalions in homeport and they 
are collectively known as SCBT classes. 
6.3.2 Officer training 
Officer training starts at the baccalaureate level.  All Civil Engineer Corps officers in the Seabees earn 
accredited engineering degrees (a pre-requisite to commissioning in the CEC).  A small percentage of 
CEC officers are commissioned via Reserve Officer Training Corps programs or at the US Naval 
Academy.  These officers receive up to four years of professional development training which includes 
introduction to all warfare communities of the Navy and the Marine Corps.  The rest of the officers in the 
CEC receive initial officer training prior to receiving a commission at Naval Officer Candidate School 
(OCS) in Pensacola, Florida.  This three month program is the officer equivalent to Boot Camp and is a 
rigorous, disciplined comprehensive training curriculum.  After commissioning into the Civil Engineer 
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Corps, all officers report to CECOS: Civil Engineer Corps Officer School at CBC Port Hueneme, 
California.  This is a 120 day training program that introduces newly minted officers to life in the CEC: 
training topics cover all aspects of CEC responsibility including Seabee operations.  CECOS even 
includes a short field exercise to give the new CEC officers a brief glimpse of life in the field with the 
Seabees. 
6.3.3 Warfare Specialist Training 
In today’s Navy, there is a significant emphasis on individual military training as part of a sailor’s overall 
professional development.  The most obvious manifestation in this renewed focus is a program known as 
warfare specialist qualification.  Most mainstream Americans know about the “Navy wings of gold” 
which represent a naval officer’s qualification as a Naval Aviator.  But what most Americans do not know 
is that similar warfare specialties exist in most communities of the Navy.  Countless policies and 
regulations have been issued at all levels of the chain of command that demonstrate a renewed emphasis 
on warfare specialty qualification.  Warfare specialty qualification has become a de facto requirement for 
promotion in the senior ranks of the enlisted community and the officer community.  It has also become 
an important decision factor in a whole host of other areas varying from performance evaluations to 
selection for job assignments and extra privileges.   
The Naval Construction Force has its own warfare specialty: the Seabee Combat Warfare Specialist 
(SCWS).  By earning a SCWS designation, a Seabee proves that he or she has the requisite professional 
skills and knowledge to plan and execute operations in the whole range of Naval Construction Force 
missions.  It requires demonstrated detailed knowledge about planning a wide range of operations 
including (but not limited to) mobility operations, defensive combat operations and contingency 
construction operations.  It also requires execution of a wide range of military skills including (but not 
limited to) field-craft, small arms proficiency, communications equipment operation and camp 
construction.  This emphasis came about because of two things: 
1. The performance of the Seabees in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm demonstrated a critical need to talk 
the same language as the US Marine Corps and other units that we would be supporting.  Among 
other things, this required the use the same methods and equipment, matching the mobility 
capabilities of the USMC, etc.  This formed the groundwork for training requirements that would be 
the foundation of the SCWS program. 
2. A few years later, the Navy as a whole began to focus on warfare specialty qualification as an integral 
part of professional development during Admiral Jay Johnson’s tour as CNO in 1996.  The Navy 
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recognized that sailors who were warfare specialists not only demonstrated more professional 
knowledge about their community, they also demonstrated more commitment to the organization and 
a bigger picture view about their individual role in the execution of their command’s mission.  In 
short, warfare specialists proved to be more valuable than sailors who had not gone through the 
qualification program. 
So it appears as though SCWS qualification is here to stay.  Therefore, it is important for this work to 
determine the impact that this program has on the NMCB Deployment Construction Program because it 
affects every operator in the system. 
As stated at the outset, the Naval Construction Force has a two-fold mission statement: We Build, We 
Fight.  This renewed focus on warfare specialties creates incentive issues for the Seabees as a 
construction organization.  There are strong incentives for Seabees to earn their SCWS qualification.  
This comes at the expense of further technical training: time spent preparing for SCWS qualification 
might otherwise be spent further perfecting construction skills.  While Seabees receive a strong baseline 
of technical training, they cannot match the expertise of their civilian counterparts who focus solely on 
their construction specialty. 
6.3.4 Command Indoctrination Training 
Since the military keeps rotating personnel, just about every military unit has some sort of “command 
indoctrination” program that introduces newly reporting personnel to its plans and policies.  These 
programs are usually “welcome aboard” briefings that also include information about living in the area.  
Most NMCBs take advantage of command indoctrination to do several things: 
· Introduce newly reporting Seabees to life in the battalion and life in the local area.  Seabees are 
introduced to battalion standard operating procedures and locations of operations. 
· Conduct annual refresher training on a wide variety of mandatory topics such as prevention of sexual 
harassment. 
· Complete command-wide administrative requirements. 
But another important concept that must be kept in mind with respect to this program is that it really 
creates a deep first impression for the newly reporting Seabees in two meaningful ways:  they evaluate the 
command by how Command Indoctrination is run and they are introduced to the command culture at 
Command Indoctrination. 
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Command indoctrination therefore, represents an important leverage point to begin acclimating new 
Seabees to the command culture.  So it is of crucial importance that battalions “get Command 
Indoctrination done right” so they get their new Seabees off to the correct start.  Command indoctrination 
is run by the battalion’s Training Department and is one of their most important training evolutions. 
6.4 Seabee and Military Culture in NMCBs 
As military combat organizations, NMCBs share a rich organizational culture with the entire US armed 
forces.  While a full description of this organizational culture is perhaps out of the scope of this work, it is 
instructive to examine those aspects of military culture that impact NMCB construction operations. 
6.4.1 Interactive Approaches 
The US armed forces have from their inception been focused on dealing with the unknown; famous 
warrior-philosopher Baron Carl Von Clausewitz refers to this as “the fog of war” in his seminal work, On 
War.  That is the heart of interactive quality control approaches: the ability of system operators to deal 
with the unknown.  Military construction technicians instinctively plan for the unknown because that is 
their legacy. 
6.4.2 Strong, Flexible Command and Control 
The discipline that has been the hallmark of the US military is rooted in strong command and control.  
However, this command and control does not necessarily mean a rigid, structured hierarchy.  Always 
pushing all available communication media to the extreme, military command and control decentralizes 
authority by instilling a strong sense of duty and loyalty to their country, their unit and their comrades.  
This sense of duty allows the US military to solve the paradox of strong command and control coupled 
with decentralized authority.  Seniors know that as long as they have promulgated the commander’s 
intent, that their subordinates will do the right thing in the prosecution of their mission. 
6.5 NMCB Organization Issues 
There are also Human and Organizational Factors that are specific to the Navy and to the Naval 
Construction Force that influence quality.  Again, the list below is far from exhaustive, but it is intended 
to be a starting point for analysis. 
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6.5.1 “Command Culture” Teams 
Navy tradition has produced several unit organizations that have Seabees have used as valuable leadership 
“force multipliers”.  Specifically, they are groups of like ranks from throughout a given battalion and they 
create powerful media for the exercise of leadership.  The officers of a battalion are typically referred to 
collectively as “the Wardroom”.  Likewise, the Chief Petty Officers of a battalion are collectively known 
as “the Chiefs’ Mess”.  And finally, the First Class Petty Officers of a battalion gather together to form 
the First Class Petty Officers’ Association.  These “command culture teams” allow the exercise of 
leadership across the battalion.  Officers can gather in the Wardroom lounge to discuss leadership issues 
that affect the entire battalion and gain consensus before implementing concepts as final policy.  
Likewise, Chiefs can gather in their lounge to solve problems that are best addressed away from the 
jobsite.  These groups foster mentoring, become an important forum for sharing resources and 
information, and become a platform for enhancing command unity and transmitting command culture.  
These groups all are steeped in Naval tradition and have various rituals and processes associated with 
them that serve to reinforce the group’s cohesiveness and maintain professionalism. 
6.5.2 Task Organized Functional Teams  
NMCBs are self-sufficient operational combat units.  A requisite result of this self-sufficiency is the 
creation of various task-organized functional teams.  In order to assure combat mobility, sustainability 
and survivability, NMCBs have set up subordinate units to address combat issues.  These teams are stood 
up on an ad hoc basis when their special tasks are required, but they periodically train to ensure their 
readiness.  These teams are: 
Air Detachment.  A battalion’s Air Detachment is a task-organized group of 91 Seabees whose mission 
is to maintain combat readiness to deploy anywhere world-wide in 48 hours.  They can perform all of the 
functions that a full battalion can, just on a smaller scale.  Their requirement to mount-out within 48 hours 
requires extensive mobility training and command and control exercise.  Their 48 hour mount-out 
exercise is typically one of the most important parts of a battalion’s homeport field exercise. 
Rapid Runway Repair Team (RRR team).  A battalion must be able to keep an active expeditionary 
airfield in an operational status.  Therefore, each battalion keeps a team of Seabees trained in the specific 
means and methods for rapid runway repair. 
Chemical, Biological Radiological Response Team (CBR team).  All combat units in the US armed 
forces face threats of conventional weapons as well as non-conventional weapons such as chemical 
compound attacks, biological pathogen attacks and nuclear weapons.  Each battalion trains a team of CBR 
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experts to conduct cleanup operations in the event of a CBR attack so that the battalion can keep 
construction operations going in CBR contaminated environments. 
Sometimes people view these units as significant distracters from primary mission because they require 
extensive training.  However, this training is the price that Seabee battalions pay for being self-sustainable 
in combat.  It is a tradeoff that has always been understood: extra time for technical training or the ability 
to survive in combat.  When viewed this way, the tradeoff analysis becomes simple. 
6.5.3 Collateral Duties 
Another requisite result of self-sufficiency is further demands on system operator’s time.  Companies and 
Battalions need Seabees to perform various duties and manage various programs so that they stay in 
compliance with Navy and NCF regulations.  These duties are assigned in addition to a Seabee’s primary 
job and include Command Managed Equal Opportunity Officer, Physical Fitness Leader, SCWS 
Coordinator, Command Retention Team, Public Affairs Officer, etc.  Again, many people view these jobs 
as significant distracters from a Seabee’s primary job, but they are required; battalions have little 
authority to leave these tasks and duties unfulfilled. 
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7 System RAM Approaches 
The second key definition of the U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Deployment Construction 
Program is to define the approaches this system uses to ensure quality.  There are countless numbers of 
these approaches, and many of these approaches have been discussed previously.  This analysis will 
examine many of the most critical approaches that the NCF uses to ensure quality in each system output: 
Ready Seabees and Shore Facilities. 
7.1 Reactive Approaches 
Safety Investigations- Mishap investigations are an important reactive approach that NMCBs use to 
reduce safety errors and failures.  A Seabee’s chain of command is required to initiate a mishap 
investigation after any type of accident that either requires medical attention or will result in a lost work-
day.  The mishap report must be signed by the Seabee’s Company Commander and submitted to the 
Safety Department within 3 working days.  This investigation does several things: 
· Informs the entire chain of command that a Seabee has been involved in a mishap 
· Allows the Safety Chief to gather specific mishap information.  This mishap information is 
compiled for various reports including battalion-wide Deployment Completion Reports.  It is also 
used for analysis by the NAVOSH Policy Council and the NAVOSH Committee. 
One potential problem with these investigations is that they currently do not cross-reference with any 
element of the project’s safety plan.  Each project develops its own safety plan; any mishap investigation 
should discuss the applicable project safety plan and what part of it failed to prevent the mishap.  
Battalions should add a field to the mishap investigation form that lists the specific construction activity 
the Seabee was working on when the mishap occurred.  There is a field that requires the investigator to 
describe the cause of the mishap and what has been done to prevent the mishap in the future.  There 
should also be a field that ties the mishap back to the Project Safety Plan to highlight the plan’s deficiency 
that allowed the mishap to occur.  Since this is an NCF specific form, it should tailored by the NCF to 
assist in reducing mishaps in construction effort. 
Regular chain of command visits- Senior members of the chain of command always make it a point to 
visit job sites on a regular basis.  The main reason for these visits is to build esprit de corps and remind 
project crews that their chain of command is concerned about them.  But another reason- just as important 
in this author’s opinion- is to let the visitor see quality attributes as they are addressed by the crews.  This 
  56  
is a reactive approach that reinforces the normal daily inspections by the QC Inspectors.  In particular, 
visits by the CO, the Operations Officer and the Company Commander reflect direct concern about 
construction quality by the upper chain of command.  During these visits, standard practice states that a 
senior member of the crew (either the Project Crew Leader or the Project Supervisor) will give the visitor 
a short tour and explain the construction activities that are in progress at the time.  Senior members of the 
chain of command use these tours to get to know the Seabees on the job sites, but they also use them as a 
random spot-check of crew member level of knowledge and involvement in the QA/ QC process. 
7.2 Proactive Approaches 
Chain of Command Safety Focus: All levels of the chain of command focus on safety in this system; it 
pervades every aspect of battalion operations.  Seemingly small things such as safety decals on every hard 
hat reinforce this safety oriented culture.  It starts with Command Indoctrination- a multi-day training 
program to introduce all incoming Seabees to command policies and procedures.  During Command 
Indoctrination, the Safety Officer typically has an entire day allotted for introduction to the Battalion 
Safety Program.  This proactive approach attempts to focus Seabees on safety during all their activities. 
Project Planning and Estimating:  The most important internal system process to ensure construction 
quality is the Planning and Estimating process.  This proactive approach forces the Project Supervisor and 
Project Crew Leader to use a disciplined approach to address all quality attributes during the construction 
phase of their project.  There is a high level of command interest in the progress and performance of this 
planning, which is beneficial.  The product of this planning process is a schedule that can be a valuable 
project execution tool. 
7.3 Interactive Approaches 
Feedback:  The most important interactive approach that the Naval Construction Force uses to ensure 
overall system quality is continuous feedback.  There are several feedback paths that are continually 
managed that allow system operators to examine system output and  
Daily safety stand-downs:  Project Crew Leaders and Safety Supervisors conduct a 5 minute safety 
lecture at the start of each day as required in the NCF NAVOSH Manual (COMSECONDNCB/ 
COMTHIRDNCBINST 5100.1A).  This is a powerful interactive approach that allows the job site chain 
of command to address specific hazards that are applicable for that day’s activities.  For example, on the 
day of a big concrete pour, the morning safety lecture might be about the hazards of concrete lime burns.  
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Five minutes seems like a short amount of time, but it is remarkably effective since it can focus in on the 
relevant hazards. 
QC inspections- The three phase QA/ QC inspection program that the NCF uses is a powerful interactive 
approach to ensuring quality and reliability in the shore facilities that Seabees build.  The continual 
interaction between the QC Inspection staff, Project Supervisor, Project Crew Leader and the crew 
members brings a wide range of experience and backgrounds to bear on the common challenge of 
ensuring quality and reliability.  Incidentally these inspections provide a fertile training ground for the QC 
Inspection staff and the Project Supervisor- as senior Petty Officers- to teach their subordinates about 
technical matters and about leadership. 
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8 HOF Influences on System Quality 
This section consists of a qualitative analysis of HOF impacts on a battalion’s operations.  The author 
conducted interviews and gave surveys to several key system operators from NMCB FOUR to see how 
HOFs influenced system quality during their recently completed deployment.  This battalion is 
homeported in Port Hueneme, California and deployed to Camp Mitchell in Okinawa, Japan from 
December 2001 until June 2002.  This was the battalion’s second consecutive deployment to Okinawa, as 
they deployed there from October 2000 until May 2001.  The surveys are contained in Appendix 7.  
The author interviewed four members of NMCB FOUR.  All interviewees were First Class Petty Officers 
during the Okinawa deployment and were selected because of their job assignments.  Their names will 
not be published.  The survey and the interviews were designed to gather thoughts and opinions about the 
deployment to Okinawa.  It was decided that First Class Petty Officers were the logical candidates to 
interview: they are senior in the chain of command, so they have considerable authority in the prosecution 
of construction projects and have valuable experience to guide their efforts.  But they are also close 
enough to the deckplates to see the day to day details out on the job sites.   
8.1 Interviews 
The author interviewed four different Seabees from NMCB FOUR on Monday November 18, 2002.   The 
author interviewed two of these Seabees individually while the other two were interviewed together.  The 
interviews were generally informal conversations that sought to elicit comments from the interviewees 
about four general concepts:  Quality Control, Project Planning, Junior Officers in NMCBs and 
Innovation.  Their comments are summarized below with a focus on the concepts which received general 
agreement. 
· Quality Control.  All four interviewees felt that the new NCF Quality Control Instruction was a good 
addition to NMCB construction operations.  Without exception, they believed that the more rigorous 
and structured meeting requirements enhanced communication and allowed beneficial communication 
to take place that helped catch potential system failures before they required rework.  However, 
another unanimous opinion was that this their battalion was still adjusting to the new requirements.  
One Builder said that she believed that the added administrative burden was a big concern because 
the Project Supervisors are already over-tasked. 
· Project Planning.  The two Builders that were interviewed both believed that planning and estimating 
needs to be improved.  They agreed that the best way to improve the process was to provide better 
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training about it: too many Seabees know how to do the math, but do not understand how the final 
schedules need to be used as a project management tool on the jobsite. 
· Junior Officers.  All four interviewees agreed that Junior Officers do not spend enough time in Seabee 
battalions.  The felt (as do most of the enlisted Seabees that this author has spoken to) that by the time 
Junior Officers figure out how things work, it is time for them to leave the battalion.  
· Innovation.  The recurring theme that all four interviewees agreed upon was the impact that money 
has upon innovation.  Most of the innovations that Seabees develop on the job sites require some sort 
of initial capital investment in order to fully implement.  They all believed that scarce resources 
prevent the NCF from implementing many innovations because of this investment.  Often, the 
interviewees believe, the money saved by the innovation far exceeds the initial investment.  But 
unfortunately, the benefit is realized in Seabee work-days, which prevents the battalion from taking 
advantage of the cost savings.  This is because the work-days are not connected to the battalion’s 
operating budget. 
8.2 Surveys 
The initial plan for this work was to conduct a detailed analysis using software known as QMAS © 
(Quality Management Assessment System).  QMAS © is an add-in program for Microsoft Access © 
developed by LCDR Brant Pickrell, CEC, USN during his graduate school tour at UC Berkeley.  
However, because of schedule conflicts, the author decided to conduct a limited survey instead in order to 
save time.  The survey questions were designed to elicit responses that measure the respondent’s opinions 
about whether or not HOFs were having a beneficial impact on NMCB FOUR’s operations during their 
Okinawa deployment.  Every numerical answer ranged from 1 (which signified a positive HOF influence) 
to 7 (which signified a negative HOF influence). 
Overall, the survey indicated that the respondents had a generally positive view of HOFs influence: that 
their battalion had a positive command culture and a satisfactory training program.  However, selection of 
Seabees for critical assignments seemed to be lacking (score average = 4). 
The survey indicated a slightly less positive view of Quality approaches.  In particular, the survey 
respondents did not feel that planning and estimating (a proactive approach) was done as well as could be. 
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9 Improving the System: Recommendations for the Naval 
Construction Force 
This section will provide recommendations based on the preceding analysis.  The U.S. Naval Mobile 
Construction Battalion Deployment Construction Program is a quality system that produces high 
reliability products: ready Seabees and quality shore facilities. But there is always room for improvement 
in any system.  As stated in the beginning, the recommendations listed below were developed to take 
advantage of “leverage points” in the system that could be changed slightly to achieve great gains.  There 
are two general recommended methods of improving this system: 
1. Improve System Components 
2. Improve System Approaches 
3. Improve Other System HOFs 
9.1 Improve System Components 
9.1.1 System Component: Procedures 
Project Management - The Project Management process is ripe for improvement.  Specifically, the P&E 
process has much room for improvement.  This process- as designed- is an effective interactive and 
proactive approach that creates a valuable management tool: the multi-level project schedule.  However, 
in practice, this process is often under-utilized.  The P&E milestone process is often circumvented 
because schedules are so busy.  “Review and approve” often devolves into “skim and sign”.  There is 
considerable incentive for this “violation” because there is little direct consequence for failure to closely 
review planning.  Many Seabees believe that “a plan is just a list of things that aren’t going to happen” 
and view the P&E program as a rote process that they do just because their Company Chief told them to.  
This unfortunate state of affairs has a considerable negative impact on the interactive value of this P&E 
program.  Additionally, it also has a negative impact on the project execution phase as well because it 
reduces the value of the project schedule as a project management tool.  Since the P&E process that 
developed the multi-level project schedule is not always fully embraced, the value of the project schedule 
itself is reduced as well.  Often the project Level III bar chart sits unused in the job site trailer instead of 
being the valuable leadership and management tool it should be. 
But how can you fix this?  One possible method involves taking advantage of existing training programs 
and sub-communities within the system.  Project Supervisors and QC Inspectors are usually First Class 
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Petty Officers who are critical operators in this part (P&E phase) of the system.  The long range 
importance of this P&E process must be driven home to these Seabees.  There are two readily available 
opportunities to drive this point home.  Project Supervisors and QC Inspectors both attend several training 
courses during the P&E process.  All of these training courses would be a good opportunity to impress 
upon them the importance of following the P&E process and demanding thorough interactive review of 
their plans.  Additionally, most battalions have an organization known as the “First Class Petty Officers’ 
Association” which is a professional organization of all the First Class Petty Officers of the battalion.  
This group- which builds relationships across the entire command- is also a good opportunity to 
emphasize the importance of the P&E process. 
9.1.2 System Component: Operators 
Company Commanders: As stated above, there is a wide variety in the level of training and experience of 
NMCB Company Commanders.  Out of all of the key system operators, Company Commanders display 
the most variation.  While this brings valued diversity to the system, it also places additional burden on 
adjoining system operators. 
This concern is more difficult to address because it involves many tradeoffs.  One potential approach is to 
lengthen CEC junior officer tours in the NCF.  Currently, junior officers only serve 24 month tours in a 
battalion.  Depending on when these officers join the command, they may only see one full deployment.  
Lengthening junior officer tours to 28 months or longer will help by providing Company Commanders 
who are more experienced in battalion operations.  This recommendation is not without tradeoffs: 
lengthening junior officer tours will decrease the amount of junior officers who can have tours in the 
NCF.  This has a negative impact on the Civil Engineer Corps as a whole: the leadership and operational 
experience junior officers get in the NCF is so valuable that the concept is “more is better”.  By 
advocating short Seabee junior officer tours, Senior CEC leadership has stated that it is better to have 
more junior officers with NCF experience than to have better Company Commanders.  This tradeoff is the 
subject of many a lively debate in Wardrooms across the world. 
9.2 Improving Approaches 
The U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Deployment Construction Program is a complex system 
that incorporates reactive, proactive and interactive approaches to ensure quality and reliability.  But there 
is also room for improvement in each of these approaches.  Some recommendations are listed below. 
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9.2.1 Recommended Reactive Approach 
A formalized near-miss reporting system would be a highly effective reactive approach to improving 
quality this system.  History tells us that there are much greater numbers of near-misses than there are 
actual accidents and incidents, so there is a wealth of analysis material waiting to be discovered.  This 
recommendation is not without challenges though.  Gathering data regarding near-misses would entail 
considerable additional workload.  But the real challenge would be finding time to analyze this data. 
There is already considerable activity going on during a Seabee deployment that demands the cognitive 
effort of all system operators. 
One way to implement a near-miss reporting system would be to assign it to Company Commanders.  As 
Project Engineers, they are required to focus on big-picture analysis of trends.  There are several “daily-
routine” type events that they do that can add up to a near-miss reporting system.  Company Commanders 
have to review and sign all daily QC Inspections and all daily Safety Inspections.  These are effective 
story-based inspection reporting documents that have a wealth of information.  They are included in 
Appendix 4 and Appendix 6 for review.  Simply instructing Company Commanders to review these 
documents with an eye towards finding and analyzing near-misses (in both safety and construction 
quality) will create a new reactive approach for this system.  Company Commanders are close enough to 
job site operations (thanks to their daily job site visits) to conduct an effective analysis but far enough so 
that the cognitive effort this analysis requires does not detract from direct management of operations. 
9.2.2 Recommended Proactive Approach 
Quantitative/ Qualitative Analysis-  The U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Deployment 
Construction Program is a prime candidate for a thorough analysis using UC Berkeley’s Quality 
Management Assessment System© (QMAS).  Interestingly enough, this program was developed by a 
Civil Engineer Corps officer but never used to analyze a NMCB Construction Program. 
9.2.3 Recommended Interactive Approach 
Safety Investigation Feedback-  As mentioned earlier, there is currently no feedback loop to tie the 
reactive mishap investigations back to the project’s original proactive safety plan.  Did the safety plan 
properly “forecast” this accident?  Does the boilerplate safety plan need to be updated?  There is no way 
to determine this.  This is a relatively simple fix: all that is required is to add a few more data fields to 
existing mishap investigation forms to capture more data and analysis: 
1. Construction Activity that was in progress during the mishap 
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2. Comparison of this Construction Activity’s Safety Plan with the mishap to determine the plan’s 
adequacy 
This data would be a valuable interactive tool to continuously update Project Safety Plans.  Currently they 
are often relegated to the status of static documents that are developed and then put on the shelf.  
Including Project Safety Plan information in mishap investigations would turn those plans into living 
dynamic documents. 
9.3 Improving other HOFs 
There is also room for other improvements in the HOFs that act throughout the entire system.  While not 
an exhaustive list, the potential improvements listed below are a start. 
9.3.1 Training and Selection 
While the NCF does a good job of selecting its system operators and training them, there are certain 
adjustments that can be made.  Some of these improvements run contrary to current policy, but they are 
offered nonetheless. 
Junior Officers.   Assignments to NMCBs are the most important job assignment decisions for junior 
officers in the Civil Engineer Corps.  Candidates are screened rigorously prior to receiving military orders 
to a NMCB.   Given the important role they fill in the battalions and the importance of this job assignment 
to their future careers, these assignments must be paramount.  This author has seen job assignments that 
were steered not by the requirements of the battalion, but by the requirements of other commands.  While 
this cannot be avoided all the time, it should be the exception, not the rule.  Our battalions deserve to be at 
the top of the priority list when decisions are being made regarding the rotation of junior officers. 
Project System Operators.  For the most part, NMCBs do a good job selecting key job assignments.  
However, there are certain things that should be kept in mind.  Positions such as Project Supervisor, 
Quality Control Inspector and Safety Inspector are important jobs in the project management process, as 
described previously.  Seabees in these jobs must enjoy the respect and esteem of their colleagues and 
their subordinates.  The best way to assure this is to require all of these Seabees to have prior experience 
as Project Crew Leaders. 
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9.3.2 HOF and engineered systems training for all levels of the chain of 
command. 
In the larger organizational structure of the Naval Construction Force, there are many leverage points that 
can be exploited to quickly influence the entire Force structure.  One of the most important of these is the 
Naval Civil Engineer Corps Officer School (CECOS).  CECOS is located at Naval Construction Battalion 
Center, Port Hueneme, CA and it is the centralized “schoolhouse” of the Civil Engineer Corps.  CECOS 
runs a comprehensive curriculum for all levels of the chain of command in all facets of Civil Engineer 
Corps operations, which includes the Naval Construction Force. 
It would be relatively easy to take advantage of this leverage point and insert valuable training about 
human and organizational factors and how they impact construction.  Appendix 8 contains a sample 
instructor guide module that could be used to instruct various levels of the chain of command about this 
valuable topic.  The author envisions that this module can be easily inserted into the existing course of 
instruction for the following courses offered by CECOS: 
· Construction Battalion Operations 
· Prospective Command Element Course 
· Prospective Executive Officer Course 
· Prospective Operations Officer Course 
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10 NCF Realignment 
Recently, the Naval Construction Force went through a comprehensive overhaul as a result of several 
synergistic factors.  The most important factor was statutory: as part of the defense appropriations bill for 
fiscal year 2001, Congress mandated that the armed services start counting the amount of time each 
service member spent deployed away from home.  This measurement is referred to as a service member’s 
personnel tempo (Pers tempo).  Further, this legislation created severe limitations to each service 
member’s op tempo and how services could deploy forces.  Seabees have historically spent long 
deployments since their inception.  In fact, Seabees have operated under waivers for several years to 
conduct their 7 month deployments.  These waivers were always justified by the fact that construction 
battalions needed 7 months to achieve enough progress on their construction projects.  The second most 
important factor was a growing dissatisfaction between operating methods in the Pacific and Atlantic 
theaters.  3rd Brigade in the Pacific and 2nd Brigade in the Atlantic both had significantly different policies 
and procedures.  Many of these can be attributed to the differing facilities, available material procurement 
vehicles and other regional differences.  However, many operating differences between the Brigades 
seemed arbitrary.  These created two significant overhauls: the deployment cycle and the upper echelon 
organizational structure. 
10.1 Deployment Schedule 
But in the wake of congressional legislation 18 months ago, the Naval Construction Force was compelled 
to completely revamp the way its NMCBs deployed in order to fall within pers tempo limits.  As a result, 
NMCBs had to go away from their traditional 7-month deployment/ 7-month homeport training cycle.  
Now, NMCBs deploy on a 6-month deployment/ 10-month homeport training cycle.  This fundamental 
change in deployment operational tempo required a complete overhaul of every aspect of NMCB 
operations.  This obviously changes many of the HOFs that govern quality.  This change is an ongoing 
process: it is only recently that all eight battalions have completed an entire 6/10 cycle, so the bugs are 
still being worked out.  The important thing to keep in mind is that the leadership of the NCF must keep 
in mind that- as with any other fundamental sea-change in any other organization- the policies, processes 
and precedents that they set today will have deep and lasting effects for a long time. 
10.2 FIRST Naval Construction Division 
The other main overhaul was implemented in order to unify Seabee operations.  In 2001, the senior 
leadership of the Civil Engineer Corps completed a study about NCF Alignment which concluded that the 
Atlantic and Pacific Naval Construction Forces should be unified under a single command element.  The 
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structure is based on the template established by the Chief of Naval Operations to unify the Atlantic and 
Pacific Fleets.  So while the West Coast Naval Construction Forces (as embodied by the 30th NCR) and 
the East Coast Naval Construction Forces (as embodied by the 22nd NCR) are two parallel, comparable 
units they are both subordinate to the FIRST Naval Construction Division.  This was made official by 
OPNAV Note 3111 (included in Appendix 9) and was consummated on 09 April 2002 when 2nd and 3rd 
Naval Construction Brigades were formally disestablished and replaced by the commissioning of the 
FIRST Naval Construction Division in a ceremony at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia. 
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11 Validation and Future Work 
This analysis is admittedly biased and incomplete.  While the author has worked with Seabees from all 
eight active duty battalions, he recently completed a 26 month tour in U.S. Naval Mobile Construction 
Battalion SEVENTY-FOUR.  Therefore many of the concepts were developed based on the operations of 
this battalion.  There is a certain amount of variation between how different battalions operate, so the first 
item of future work would be to gather the perspectives of different battalions.  This can be done through 
various means: formal and informal interviews with Seabees from other battalions and other NCF units, a 
review of policies, procedures and documents of different battalions and a review of NCR and NCB 
evaluation documents. 
One main shortcoming of this analysis is its largely qualitative nature.  There is a world of quantitative 
data that can be gathered that might further validate the hypotheses set forth in this work.  The most 
immediate opportunity for future work was mentioned above: a thorough analysis of battalion operations 
using QMAS©.  Such a project could be a valuable validation of the analyses and recommendations set 
forth in this work. 
The Civil Engineer Corps sends several junior officers to graduate school every year all across the 
country.  While many of these officers study other disciplines, it may be possible to convince some to 
conduct further study.  Additional analytical resources could possibly be made available from other 
training commands such as the Naval Construction Training Centers that train enlisted Seabees in 
technical construction skills or the Civil Engineer Corps Officer School in Port Hueneme that runs a wide 
variety of training for the entire NAVFAC/ Civil Engineer Corps family. 
Given the fundamental changes discussed in the previous chapter, it will definitely be worthwhile to 
revisit this work after the system reaches a steady state in the coming months.  The Naval Construction 
Force is undergoing fundamental realignments and quantum changes in the way it does business, so a 
second look after the “bugs get worked out” is definitely appropriate.   
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12 Conclusion 
The U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Deployment Construction Program is a complex multi-
faceted engineered system that represents a valuable win-win proposition for the battalions and for the 
host Naval Stations.  The host station receives quality shore facilities and the battalions receive a fertile 
training ground to sharpen their military readiness. 
This analysis defined this complex system: its inputs, its components and the approaches it uses to 
achieve quality and reliability.  Throughout this system description, the HOFs that influence quality in 
each component were highlighted for emphasis.  After fully describing this system, this work proposed 
two general methods to improve quality and reliability in this system: improvement of various system 
components and improvement of quality approaches.  Specific leverage points for improvement were 
cited through examples. 
As military combat units, there are several strengths that Naval Mobile Construction Battalions have that 
provide great benefits towards their construction efforts and their training efforts.  Strong command and 
control, resourceful ingenuity and supportive leadership culture all work together to produce a valuable 
team of construction professionals.  However, their two-fold “build and fight” mission statement means 
that necessarily some of their time must be spent training to fight: enhancing combat mobility, learning 
small unit infantry tactics, etc.  This detracts from their ability to fully complete technical training that 
their counterparts in the civilian industry might.  Further, the career paths, operational tempo and “up or 
out” promotion pattern all combine to reduce the time a Seabee spends actually on the job site perfecting 
his or her trade.  This tradeoff results in Seabees who - while not quite as polished as their colleagues in 
the civilian world- are nonetheless remarkably flexible and innovative. 
This is not to say that there is anything wrong with current operations.  Time and time again Seabees of 
U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalions have distinguished themselves with their ingenuity and their 
work ethic to become the engineer force of choice in the U.S. Department of Defense.  But as with any 
system, there is room for improvement.  There are many available resources and leverage points to enact 
such improvement and growth. 
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REQUIRED OPERATIONAL MISSION AREAS 
AND 
READINESS CONDITION DESCRIPTIONS 
FOR THE 
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE (NCF) 
1. l'vfissioo Areas. The primacy mission of the Naval Constnwtion Force (NCF) is to •upport Marine Air-Ground 
Task Forces (MAGTFs) and Navy ashore forces as required by the OPL-'IN and to provide additional .-upport to the 
CINC or JFC (JTF Commande•·) as required, including construction of advance bases and battle damage repair. 
Requit:ed OpeutionaJ Capabllities t•ange from expedient temporaty conslruclion to permanent conslnlcfion and 
operation of advanced industrial facil ities. TI-.e NCF ~upports other :.~vices during Militaty Optet.'ations: O:her Than 
War (MOOTW), and J>">forms humanitarian aid and disaster relie.f operations. In oocordanoe with refelffi<le (a), 
the following prinuuy and seo{lndary wmfare mission areas f!lr unit types comprising the NCP are assigned as 
follows: 
a.. Navtt.l Construction Brigades (N CD) : Provides forces to fulfill operational requir~nems of a. c ombatant 
commander exerciring command an.d control over Na.val Constmction Regimenti', providing planning. training. and 
oversight. 
Naval Construction Brigade 
CCC C'W CON FSO MOB MOS NCO 
p s s s p s s 
b. Naval Conttturti&n Reg:ime.nts (NCR): Exercises command and control over subordinate NCPunits, 
providing planning, training, and oversiglu. 
Naval Coru:tructlvn Re~meot 
MIW CCC f!>W CON FSO MOB MOS NCO 
s p s p s p s s 
c. Naval M•bile C'oM<rU<Ii•u llattali• n• (NM<.tl): Consoructs advance base f)r;ilities in .-upport of the 
Nav>r~ Marine Cotps 31d other armed set".rices engaged in m ilirary operations and is capable of defensive. conibal 
operations. NMCBs also provide repair, maintenanot- and constrtlCtion support during contingency, emergency or 
dis..tcr rec<.-·ery opera! ions. The NMCB has an organic TOA capable of sustaining operational controL planned or 
envisioned wtder contingency or general war cooditions foe 60 da)''!i. requiring replenishment of corutunabk!i only. 
{ava Mobi Fo- I MOB MOS NCO AMW CCC C'1 CON I 
s S I P I F s 
d. Naval Coo•truc:tioo Force Suppon Uoits (NCFSIJ) : Providos construction and ongineoring rupport for 
NCF onit.. including specializled CESE, material, repair p&ts and teclmicalexpetti~. NCFSU echelons are 
attached to other NCF ~mits to manage, maintain and inventory material) transportation and con&tru¢tion equipment 
to augment the NMCB TOA. 
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Na:vaJ Consll'oction Fot·c.e Soppo1t 'Ul it 
CCC CON c:w FSO MOB NC.'O 
p p s p p s 
e. CoortrU<tion Batratioo Maintenan<e Units (CBMU): Provide foUow-on public work.• operation•, 
maintenance and Npair at exif.ting advanced base shore facilities or faci lities ¢Otutl1.JOted by NMCBs in ¢ontingency 
op~r at iotw. 
f. Unde~·ater Construdioo Teams (UCO: Provide m1derwater engineering, coat.ID'nction, repair and 
inspection support UCTs petform com pie" inshore md deep ocean m1derwater construotion task.~ including o¢ean 
bottom ~11rvey:; for pot~ntiallmderwater faciliri~. 
g. Construction B•ttalion U rut• (CBU): The Construction Battalion Unit (CBU) provides conslruorion, 
operation and maintenance support to a Combat Zone (CBTZ) Fle<>l Hospital (FH) dnring military operations. 
Con<>b:uction Battalion Unh 
CCC CON C'W FSO MOB MOS NCO 
s p s p p s s 
2. R ... dinews States !Foo· NCB• and NCRs onlv) Requio:ed Operational Capabilities (ROCs) are reported under 
Readiness Staief>: having major s:igniiicanoe in deteonining the rutit•s total manpo<;ver requirements. The-following 
summarize states cove£ed. 
RHdioesJj St:ue I: Full Cootingeocy Rhl:dii)('SS 
Signiftcant ;trategio and/or tact ical indication.• ofimn1inent bo.tilities. While in &adiness Stale I, the staff 
shall be capable of meeting the foUowing criteria: able to perform general engineering support, oversight and 
construction pbau1ing functions for a supported command. This state support~ war and operation plans 
executed at Defenoe Conditions (DEFCON} I and II, and m'\jor civil ..,-;,tanoe operations. Transition to this 
ma.ximum >tate of readiness begins wi1h the declaration ofDEFCON n (heightened temions and/or 
indkarions- that an en~my force is taking actions "¥ili~h increas~ its readine$S' for an attack) with an o\:ti.ec-tive 
for fuJJ implement;:4ion prior to the onset ofDFFCON I. AJI watdl stations and vital positions \\<ill be manned 
to sustain operations in the designated comtnand configuration indefinitely once implementation is complete. 
Attainment of this state inclodes providing plan-spedfted augmentation asse-ts to val'ious: re.mofec.ommand 
centers, posts and units. 1be staff and supporting commands will take all measures neoess.ary to ensore all 
&closure (I} 2 
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primary and battJe-redWldant system$ &e· maintained in aroaximum sbie of readiness. All peor$onoel a$$eiS 
detailed in notional, theater and l81it mobiliz.otion p!oro; shall be staffed by perrnonent personnel, earmad<ed 
reserv-es and augmenteef.!. 
Readiues~~t State ll: Tnilol'ed Cootiogencv Readinus 
Signif);ant strate-gic and' or tactical ind~ations of potential limited hostilities or regional, loc:aliz¢d civil 
.. ,i.tance operations. As dir<Gted by higher authority, portial augmentation is required to sllilain a readiness 
p0<1ure tailored to a limited threat (Reserve augmentation is initiated for backfill of embedded NCR personnel 
within the NCB organizations). Sinc-e sc~narios carmot be fLxed in advance for all foreseeable combinations of 
circurnstances other than fuU readinei$) a Readiness State II cohmm is not portra}~ed in the table of ROC$. 
Rt-tulioess State ill: C urrent Oeerat.ions Rt"adioess 
Cood'utJing current operations wlthoui mobiliud!B.ugmentation assets. Watch stations and vital positions: 
s:offioient to sustain the-.ater and looa.l operations at the. DBPCON TV and m or minor civil assistance 
operation!> are manned and ready. Tile staff is able to initial ize major wat/operations plans in advance of 
augmentation support This readiness state is the sum total of those watc.h stations and vital positions required 
to support routine operations in DBPCON IV (geopolitical instabiliry exists in the area of operations wl1ich 
requires constant vigilance and monitoring for rapidly escalating. emergent developments) and tbe additional 
walch stations and ''~a) pos~ions required to immediately surge to a level to wpport DEFCON Ill (ten>ions 
exi>t wbieb may have serio"' and adverse effect:;, and the possibility of foo:oc· involvement exist:;). All 
personnel .,,et:; to support this readiness stole shall be permanent staff "'";ets. 1he >toff and suppotling 
commands will pcovide routine· organiz..<dional Jevel maintenance. (Ac.tion is canied out by eml::edded NCR 
penomel within the NCB ot:gMizations.) 
Readin~ State J V; Trai ni og Readio~ 
In a non-deployed environment monitoring the military/civil situations in the cowmand1s primary and 
contingency areas ofrespom~ibility (AOR) and routinely conducting or parti¢ipating in exercises. The staff is 
updating and evaluating war/operations plans. Maximum adv31ltage of training opportunities is to be taken. 
The staff and augmentees will frequently simulate surging Readiness ~htes I, II and ill during ooth live and 
command poil exercise.-. The staff will be afforded the opportunity to take leave and liberty consistent with 
exer<:iie and regular work requirements. The staff and $twpportiug c.omma1ds wiJJ petform routine 
organizational level maintenance. 
3. Readio .. s Conditions !For oil units eJrctpt NCJls ood NCRs) Required Operationol Capabilities (ROCs) are 
reported under Readiness Conditions havingmajo[ significance in de1ennining the onit's ioiaJ manpotver 
cequiJ·e.ments. The following swnmarize conditions covered. 
Readiness Condition 1~ Batt]e Rf!9.(line1Js 
While in Condilion L d.>< unit mall be capable of meeting the following criteria; able to perform all defensive 
ftmctions simultaneoU!Jiy; able to keep all tactical sy-stems manoed and operating for ma~imwn effectiveness. 
The maxim tun expected continuous endurance for Condition I is 24 hours. Construction operatjons arc-no~ 
appropriate unless deemed operationally critical by the commander. 
3 EocloS1.U:O {I) 
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Readiness Coadition D: 1\>lodifi~d Bu.ttleRe:utiness 
Conditjon ][is Condition I BattJe Readines;> modified to meet imminent tlueals that are situation-dependent. 
As such, Condit.ion II is a subset of Condition !that s tands up particular Condition ! capabi~ties at tho 
di"Cretion of tho commander. While in condition I!, lhe Wlit shall be capable of meeting tho following 
critt!ria: able to simultaneously pedonn defen.,ive ftn10tions llece9$-3IY to counter specific imm inent> limited 
threats; able to keep comtruction crew$ and critical project siter fuUy m anned and operating; able to pedotm 
command and control funotiour relevant to the threat; able to aocomplish wgent. planned maintenm ce and 
~-upport fwlctiom. The maximum expected continuotlS duration for Condition II is 10 days, with a minimum 
of 4 to 6 hours of rest provided per ma-t per day. Since scemu.ios cannot be fixed in advan~ fot· aU foreseeable 
combinations of c ircumstances other than ft1ll general quarters, a. Condition II colwnn is not portrayed in th~ 
cable ofROCs. 
R~diness CGildition W : \VartimeJJnereasM TeosienJForW&rd DwiGyed ReruliMss 
Defe..ns ive posture is maintained to a level suffioient to counter possible threats . While in Condition ID, the 
onit shall be capable of meeting the following criteria..: able to keep construction crew~ :;nd project sites fully 
manned and opetaring; able to accomplish all normal maintenance. suppon and administrative functions. 
The rninimtun expected Cl'e'OJ endurance for Condition DI is 60 comecotive days, with opportuniry for 8 hours 
of rest provided per man per da)'· Condition III exists when deployed to a contingency area where hostilities 
exirt oc are a.nt;cipated. 
Ru.diness Condition IV: Peacetime Dmlovrd Readiness 
While in cundition IV, dle unit $hall be capable of meeting the folluwing cdlecia: maintain and utilize Wctical 
~ystems to lhe extent ne«ssru:y to enswe Qpecalional proficfmcy. Max:imtun advant• is taken of training 
oppotitUlitie~. Expected endurance is not constrained by persormel. Able to immediately change readiness 
posture to Omd.ition 1, ll or DL 
Read iness Condition V: H omeoort R~a(lintn 
D• s ignated planning and training period in unit' s hom•porl. While in c ondition V, the m>it shall be oapabl<! 
ofm~ting dl~ following criteria: able t o accomplish all r~quired m ainrenance> 1>uppon, and adminktrariv~ 
functions. Priority of effort is to ma'>iwize training to attain/maintain readiness c.apabiliti~s . Subje¢t to the 
foregoing requi .. ements. the c.l'ew will be provided oppothmity for leave and liberty. 
4. ROC symbols are osed to ~pecify the desired level of achleveme.nt of readiness or otherW!Ilk for or dur~1g a 
partioulat readiness c.onditii)n. Readiness normally applies to watches~ evolutions or both, while ofhe.r work refers to 
non·watoh ootivity sooh as per:fonningmaintenanee or rormingthe galley. 
rr}i',, = "Full" 1be capability is to be fuUy achieved. Por operational ftmctlons, this means lhat 
tacticalfoperationaJ 1))'stems wiU be fl1!1y manned to ,Je!<ign canHbjljtv. The ach~vement is to 
be-sustained for the dlB:ation of the condition Wllc!5s modiltcd by an "A" oc "E11• 
"L" = "Limited" Theoapabilily is to be only partially realized. Even though only limit•d 
c.apabllity is realize~ it is to be sustained for the dura-ion of the condition 1mless modif.ed by 
&closure (I} 4 
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an" A" or "E"'. E"-e1·y "L 11 must be rupported by a limiting fAatement $pecifyingthe 
limitation. 
~fodifi~l"S: 
"A" = uAUlWt:Dt'll:tioon Tife_ capability is to be. eiiher fully or pl¥1ially achieved for a limited time 
during the condition. The capability is achieved by using off·walch Jl"CSOnneillld is always 
a;s.wcjated wjlh au ''F" or "L". 
"E" - '1Sp«ia.l Team~~ Tile capability js to be either fully or partially achieved for a limited time 
during the wndition. lhe c~ability is achieved by us:ing off-watch $peciaJ teams or details 
and is: always associated with an "F" or ''L" . 
Unit's: Comp$.0)" llDd External Personnel Resources. Normally, using an "A" ot "B" requires no embellishing 
sta.Iemem as: tl1eir meaning~ are- predef.ned. Hov.tever, in the case of a tmit embarking external resources, lhe-
meaning may not be clear as to whelbet the augmenta~ion should be provided by lhe unit~ personnel or the external 
resource. 
Thi• ROC/POE instruction •hows: 
• If the resooroe is unit's company~ no elaboration ot statement is provided. 
• If the resource is external for "F'. a Note is added to the ROC stating the t-esource. 
• If Ole re-source is extemal for "'L", the resumoe is added to the· capability limiting statement. 
C APABD.,I1Y 
I MODll1ER I FULL LIMITED 
None- :) lndefiu.itely mann«~ to d~iga Indefinitely manned to I••• 
capacity fb-.o designed eapucity 
A => Tt'a,pou.rily ruaooed to design Tt'ruporarily manned to J~ 
ta.pacity ttsiog or~ watch than design capacity using orr .. 
persoxu.t:d. wateb pea-soood. 
E = TemJ,Orarily maooed to d~sigo Tempon1rily manned lo less 
t .-ap i city ttdog 9. tptd:alream t.h:lD dtsign taps.t ily usiag :11 
iipe<:isl u~~ra 
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PROJECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
FOR 
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BA TfALION (NMCB) 
1. The Naval Mobile Construction Baualion (NMC'B) constructs advanced base fooi lities in support of the Navy, 
Marine C()rps and othe-r anned services engaged ln militaty fiperations and is capable of defe-.ns:ive combat 
operations. 
2. The most demanding operating environment anticipated for the NMCB is in a foreign country during 
wartime, ped'orming engineer ing combat 11<rvicc support for the Marine Air-<Jround Ta.* Force (MAGTF) 
operating in climates ranging from extreme cold to tropical to desert environments. Tile NNlCB is capable of 
limited operations in aCBR-conlaminated environment. 
3. An NMCB mey oporate in >moll task oq;ontz.,d unit• (with • fal\ll< of e<>mmond and control option•) 
throughout- the theafer within the fttll spectrum of threat environments. N~iCBs may enco\.mter ocganized 
battalion-sized groW1d combat units, special operations focce:;:, guerrilla and terrorist activities. A ~ubstantial 
peroeotage o.f operations will be prosecuted in joint/combined ooenarios. 
4. In Operation.• Other Than War (OOT\V}, NMCBs are involved in the ful l spectrum of operations i>eluding 
peooekeepin& hmuanitarian assistance, civic action, diswter rec-overy and routine base facility operations and 
mainteoanoe. The .. operations are frequently oharacte~·ized by confined and congosted areas occupied by friends, 
adversaries, and Deutrak, making identUtcation and coordination difficult. \\'ell armed adversaries and t1flj)1able 
geopolitical environme-nts require iuctea$~d de-fensive measme-s, making the pro~ution of public works, 
construction, operations, maintenance and repair functions more difficult. NtvfCBs at•ecapable ofperfatming 
constl'l.lC.tion in a low threat environment whidl requires a defel'6ive postwe in W1Secured and isolated locations 
without the dlrect pmcection of S11pporred forces. A StlbstamiaJ pe.a·ctntage of operations: will be pmsecuted in 
joint/combined scenarios. 
5. An NMCB may operate as part of ml NCR or as the single NCP element in support of the Area or Force 
Corum ander. 
6. Capable ofperfonning assigned primaty mission areas simuJtaneomly while performing defensive functions 
to protect NMCB persoruJoel. camps. job sites, and convoys against groWld troops and light armored vehicles to 
include-: perimeter defense; secwity patrols; opporttme ambwib; $ite/engineeringr«oonoitering; observation and 
1irtening posts; defensive-reaction force; and other measures that enhanx-the defense-of the Wlit. Construction 
and maintenance capabilities .:kcrea..Qij as defensive requirements/combat situations increase. 
7. The ~1CB has 311 organic TOA capable of sustaining operational control, plarmed or envisioned W1der 
contingency or general w a- conditions for 60 days without resupply except ammtmieion is limited to 15 days, 
subsi .. ence rations ;ue limited to 5 deys, and fuel is limited to 3 days. The NMCB Air DetO<lhmenl TOA i• capable 
ofros(aining operational control1 plamed or envisioned t.111der contingency or general war conditions for 30 days 
without resupply except runtnunition, fuel ond rations ore limited to the days st:ted above. Resupply past tl>ese 
time frames is 6le responsibility of the supported command. 
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  14 November 2002 
From: LT Roland J. de Guzman, CEC, USN 
To: Survey Respondents, U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion FOUR 
Subj: SURVEY ABOUT HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS IN THE NAVAL 
CONSTRUCTION FORCE 
Encl: (1)  Survey About Human and Organizational Factors in the NCF 
1. Situation.  Thank you for taking part in this survey.  I greatly appreciate your time and 
effort.  I am a graduate student at UC Berkeley and a former “Fearless Seabee” from US Naval 
Mobile Construction Battalion SEVENTY FOUR.  As a former Charlie Company Commander, I 
decided to write an academic thesis to study how Human and Organizational Factors play a 
significant role in Naval Construction Force operations.  Our two-fold Build and Fight mission 
in the Seabees has significant impact on the outcome of the construction projects we do.  Part of 
my research involves gathering survey data from the field; this is where you come in.  This 
survey is designed to gather your thoughts and opinions about your most recently completed 
deployment to Okinawa.  You have been chosen because- in my humble opinion- you are the 
critical Seabees in our construction effort.  You are senior in the chain of command, so you have 
considerable authority in the prosecution of our construction projects and you have valuable 
experience to guide your efforts.  But you are also close enough to the deckplates to see the day 
to day details out on the job sites where we really “make our money” as construction 
professionals. 
2. Mission.  I have developed a short informal survey for you to fill out.  This survey will 
quantify- to some extent- how you feel about the deployment you completed in May. 
3. Execution. Once you receive this survey, please fill it out at your leisure.  It only requires 
you to circle your answers, but there will be space for you to provide additional comments.  
Further, I will conduct a personal interview, tentatively scheduled for Monday, 18 November.  
Please limit your thoughts and responses to events from the most recent Okinawa deployment. 
4. Admin and Logistics.  If you are done with the survey early enough, you can give it directly 
to me.  If not, simply give it to BUC (SCW) Tuazon over at the Safety Department and he will 
mail it to me. 
5. Command and Control.  If you have any questions about this survey, please e-mail me at 
deguzman@uclink.berkeley.edu or call me at 510.703.3708. 
6. Conclusion.  Thank you again for your time and effort.  I will use your responses to form 




R. J. DE GUZMAN 

























Survey: Human and Organizational Factors in the Naval Construction Force 


















Engineering and Project Management Group 
Civil & Environmental Engineering Department 
University of California, Berkeley, CA 
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Survey Instructions  
This survey is designed to gather your thoughts and opinions about your most recently completed 
deployment to Okinawa.  As you answer these questions, please limit your decisions to events 
from that deployment.  If you want to discuss other topics, please use the comments sections. 
 
For your answers, please use the following scale: 
1. Strongly agree with little or no doubt 
2. Strongly agree 
3. Agree 
4. No feelings one way or another 
5. Disagree 
6. Strongly disagree 
7. Strongly disagree with little or no doubt 
 
1. Mission 
a. In your own words, please write down the mission of your Battalion during your 2002 
deployment to Okinawa.  Then describe your particular team’s part of that mission: 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
 
2. Human and Organizational Factors  
 
a. Selection:  A critical factor that influences quality in construction is the selection of key 
positions in the project team.  Do you feel that you were properly selected for your job during the 
Okinawa Deployment ’01-’02? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
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b. Selection: Do you feel others in the chain of command (above you or below you) were 
selected properly? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
c. Training: Do you feel that you received the proper training for your rating during 
A-School? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
d. Training: Do you feel that you received the proper training for your job during C-School 
(if any)? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
e. Training: Do you feel that you received the proper training for your job assignment for 
this deployment during homeport training? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
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f. Training: Do you feel that other members of your project team received sufficient 
training for this deployment? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not?  What job did they have?  What type of training would have helped? 
              
              
              
              
 
g. Command Culture: The command climate and culture is another factor that significantly 
influences construction operations.  Which of the following project attributes do you believe 
your command valued the most on the construction project/s that you worked on? 
q Safety q Durability q Schedule q Cost q Environmental 
 
h. Command Culture: Which of the following project attributes did YOU value the most on 
the construction project/s that you worked on?  
q Safety q Durability q Schedule q Cost q Environmental 
 
i. Command Culture: Were you able to instill this value (selected above) in the other 
members of your project team? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
j. SCWS: Are you SCWS qualified? 
q Yes    q No  
 
k. SCWS: Did your battalion’s SCWS program significantly impact the performance of 
your construction team? 
q Yes    q No  
If you answered Yes, please describe this impact: 
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l. Organization: Were you a part of the battalion’s specific task-organized teams?  (ie. Air 
Det, RRR, CBR, etc.). 
q Yes    q No  
If you answered Yes, list your organizations and your duties within those teams: 
              
              
              
              
 
m. Organization: Please indicate whether or not the requirements of any of the battalion’s 
task-organized teams impacted the following aspects of your deployment projects: 
1) Homeport: Job Assignment   q Yes    q No 
2) Homeport: Planning and Estimating q Yes    q No 
3) Homeport: Training   q Yes    q No 
4) Deployment: Construction  q Yes    q No 
Please name the task-organized team that impacted your project the most: 
              
* Note: This impact does NOT have to be a result of YOUR personal involvement on a 
task-organized team.  For example, you may have been a Crew Leader but Air Detachment 
requirements prevented you from getting a properly trained Project Safety Supervisor for your 
project. 
 
3. Risk Assessment and Management Approaches 
Risk Assessment and Management is the most critical thing that we do in the Seabees.  For the 
following questions, please use a more general definition of risk as articulated by Terje Aven and 
Robert Bea: 
Risk:  The product of the likelihood that adequate or acceptable quality is not achieved 
and the consequences associated with the lack of achieved quality.1 
In other words, risk involves more than just the likelihood of physical injury.  It involves 
concepts such as the risk of insufficient structural durability or risk of going over budget. 
 
a. Proactive Approaches:  Do you think that the planning and estimating efforts in homeport 
properly prepared your team for your deployed construction project? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
                                                 
1 pg 117, Bea, Human and Organizational Factors: Risk Assessment and Management of Engineered Systems   
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b. Proactive Approaches:  Do you think your command culture properly reinforced an 
environment that focused on safety to prevent mishaps? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
c. Reactive Approaches:  Do you think Mishap Investigations were conducted properly?  
Were they effective in passing on lessons learned to prevent future mishaps? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
d. Reactive Approaches:  Do you think regular visits by the chain of command effectively 
evaluated the causes of problems and determined ways to fix them? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
e. Interactive Approaches: Do you think the QC Program created an effective team to 
continuously evaluate the progress and quality of your construction project during this 
deployment? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
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f. Interactive Approaches: Do you think that daily Stand-up Safety Lectures effectively 
reduced safety mishaps on your project?  Did Crew Leaders prudently selected lecture topics that 
matched a given day’s construction activities?  Were the lectures effective? 
q 1  q 2  q 3  q 4  q 5  q 6  q 7 
If not, why not? 
              
              
              
              
 
4. Additional Comments :  Please use this space to make any other comments you feel may be 
helpful.  Feel free to continue on the back if necessary. 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
 
5. Thank you again for your time and effort in filling out this survey.  I also want to take this 
opportunity to thank you for your service; you are part of a special team of construction 





R. J. DE GUZMAN 
LT, CEC, USN 
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1Civil Engineered Systems 
in the NCF




n Civil Engineering Systems/ Life Cycles
n Human and Organizational Factors
n Quality Approaches
n Conclusion
Training itinerary for today
3Course Objectives
n Traditional look at construction and civil 
engineering
n New look at construction and civil 
engineering
n System-wide approach
HOFsCourse Objectives Engineered Systems Quality Approaches
Civil Engineered Systems 
- This module will present a different way to look at our projects and our jobs.  
This look is perhaps more complete because it looks at everything involved in 
a given construction project, including the design, the crew members, etc.
- In the Navy and in the Seabees, we learn a lot about leadership.  We also 
learn a lot about engineering.  But we don’t often learn about how they interact 








HOFs Quality ApproachesCourse Objectives Engineered Systems
Civil Engineered Systems 
Definition: An engineered system is a network of structures, procedures and 
people designed and built for a specific purpose.
But this is not a satisfactory definition.  To fully understand engineered 
systems, we have to answer a few questions:
- What are the components of an engineered system?
- What do we mean by quality in an engineered system?









Course Objectives Engineered Systems HOFs Quality Approaches
These are the seven components that make up a given engineered system.  
For the most part, they are self-explanatory.
Each of these components requires specific management attention. This 
nomenclature gives us a framework to view our processes and determine if we 
are giving each component the appropriate type and amount of attention.
6System Components







Source: R.G. Bea, 2001
A visual representation of how these components interact.
7System Quality






Course Objectives Engineered Systems HOFs Quality Approaches
What defines system quality?
The term “quality” is so commonly used, that it remains poorly defined most of 
the time in everyday conversation.  However, this analysis requires an explicit 
definition of system quality.  Dr. Bob Bea from UC Berkeley tells us: [Quality is] 
freedom from unanticipated defects.  Quality is fitness for purpose.  Quality is 
meeting the requirements of those that own, operate, design, construct and 
regulate engineered systems.  These requirements include those of 
serviceability, safety, compatibility and durability.
Durability:  Freedom from unexpected degradation.
Serviceability: Suitability and fitness for purpose.
Compatibility: Free of undesired consequences to other entities.  On time, on 
budget and happy customers.
Safety: Free of unexpected and unmanaged risk of damage.  This is the most 






– Determine which quality components are 
most important for the client
– Production versus Protection
Course Objectives Engineered Systems HOFs Quality Approaches
Important concepts regarding quality:
Reliability:  The probability a given system will exhibit a given level of quality
Robustness: The ability of a given system to maintain quality while sustaining 
damage
Tradeoffs:  This is where junior officers and senior enlisted make our 
money…in managing the gray areas and evaluating day to day tradeoffs.
Production vs Protection: This is the classic example of a tradeoff between 
quality components.  We’ll talk about this later…
9Human and Organizational Factors
Where Leadership Meets Engineering
n NMCBs as HROs
n Selecting System Operators
n Training System Operators
n Command Culture
n Knowledge Management
Course Objectives Engineered Systems Quality ApproachesHOFs
In the armed forces, we spend more time focusing on leadership than in just 
about any other sector of professional endeavor.  In the Seabees, we spend 
more time focusing on engineering than many other sectors of the Navy.
But there is a place where leadership meets engineering.  That place is called 
Human and Organizational Factors.
These concepts govern the management of engineered systems just as much 
as do concepts such as soil settlement and load distribution.
These are not all of the HOFs that operate.  This concept is not as well defined 
as others, so there is not even a universally accepted taxonomy. But this 
doesn’t mean we should ignore it.
10
High Reliability Organizations
nWhat is an HRO?
n Are NMCBs HROs?
n How can we get there?
Course Objectives Engineered Systems Quality ApproachesHOFs
HRO:  High Reliability Organization.
Dr. Robert Bea from UC Berkeley defines HROs as: organizations that have 
operated nearly error free over long periods of time.  Dr. Bea and his 
colleagues conducted extensive research about HROs in varied disciplines 
such as Naval Aviation, infant, neo-natal emergency care wards, and the 
French National Police.  His research yields a list of common practices and 
characteristics of these HROs.
Are NMCBs HROs?  The provided definition of HRO leaves room for 
interpretation, but this author would offer that Seabee battalions do exhibit 
many of the characteristics that distinguish HROs.  Furthermore, Seabee 
battalions often exhibit many of these characteristics that their civilian 
counterparts in the construction industry do not, thanks mostly to their military 
culture.
If NMCBs are not HROs, then how do we get there?  By crisply defining what 
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Training and Selection tend to be different but inter-dependent concepts.  
Selection of billets is dependent upon the training resources available and vice 
versa.
Junior officers are not always civil engineers, so their main thrust has always 
been project management.  This is important to realize when selecting JOs for 
assignments to battalions and for selecting deployment assignments.
Enlisted Seabees gain valuable technical training in A-school, but it is 
designed to create generalists, not specialists.  This is a big reason why finish 
work in the Seabees often lags behind that of their civilian counterparts.






n “Command Culture Teams”
n Production vs Protection
Course Objectives Engineered Systems Quality ApproachesHOFs
Core Values- We (the U.S. Navy) have published our core values. This act 
alone goes a long way towards establishing a command culture.  But if you 
add the fact that we do a reasonably good job of weaving these values into our 
training pipeline, our mission statement development and our daily operations 
you get a synergy and harmony between vision and action, objectives and 
operations.
Unit Integrity- As an armed service, we prize unit integrity.  This impacts how
we do business on the job site, esp regarding things such as job selection and 
crew selection.
“Command Culture Teams”: Wardroom, Chief Petty Officers’ Mess and First 
Class Petty Officers’ Association are all professional development 
organizations that go a long way towards creating and reinforcing command 
culture.  They represent strong leverage points that senior leadership can use 
to guide the entire organization.
Production vs Protection curve…next slide.
13
Command Culture
n Safety versus Schedule










Source: pg 85, Bea 2002
Catastrophe
This graphic visually demonstrates the “incident-driven” nature of safety focus.  
An organization starts out focused on safety (protection), but gradually begins 
to cut corners and focus on production.  This happens until an accident which 
causes everyone to “tighten up” and re-focus on safety.  This cycle occurs until 




– Tacit versus Codified Knowledge





– Sensemaking and seizing opportunity
Course Objectives Engineered Systems Quality ApproachesHOFs
Transferability
* Codified Knowledge:  Knowledge which is encoded into symbology (words, numbers, 
etc.).
* Tacit Knowledge: Knowledge which is not codified.  A given organization’s tacit 
knowledge lies in the minds of its members.  However, it also lies in places such as 
the processes and equipment the organization employs, the relationships and 
organizational structures it uses, etc.
* Means and methods.  Tacit knowledge is much harder to transfer than codified 
knowledge.  The spectrum goes from information à codified knowledge à tacit 
knowledge.  It requires actual personnel transfer to effect tacit knowledge transfer, and 
even that does not always completely accomplish the transfer.
Competencies: These are the two major competencies that we have as project managers in 
the NCF (whether we are Company Commanders, Operations Chiefs, Project Supervisors, 
Crew Leaders, Safety Supervisors, etc.)
Engineering
Leadership
Dynamic Capabilities: Dynamic Capabilities
Put simply, Dr. David Teece (Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley) defines dynamic 
capabilities as the ability of a given organization to recognize and seize opportunity.
* Sensemaking and seizing opportunity.  Lots of research exists about these two 
topics, but we learn about this in the OODA loop: Observe, Orient Decide, Act.
15
Readiness



















This is a VERY general qualitative visual description of military readiness 
throughout the deployment cycle of an NMCB.  Readiness is probably the key 






Course Objectives Quality ApproachesHOFsEngineered Systems
There are three types of approaches that an engineerd system employs to 
ensure quality:
A proactive appraoach is an approach that system operators take to ensure 
quality by preventing errors and failures.
A reactive approach is an approach that system operators take to ensure 
quality by determining the best ways to fix errors after they have happened 
and by passing on knowledge about errors so that they do not occur in the 
future.
An interactive approach is an approach that system operators take to ensure 
quality by iteratively examining and acting on a particular activity to ensure 




n Planning and Estimating
n Team Knowledge
n Chain of Command Visits
Course Objectives Quality ApproachesHOFsEngineered Systems
A proactive approach is an approach that system operators take to ensure quality by 
preventing errors and failures. These approaches listed are familiar concepts to Seabees, 
but it is important to realize their role in ensuring a quality product.
Design QC:  CEC Officers at headquarters commands and NAVFAC commands should be 
involved in the QC process- when practical- of the design of Seabee construction projects.
Planning and Estimating;  It is hard to overstate the direct impact that good planning and 
estimating can have on creating a quality product.  This is a proactive approach that can 
pay big dividends.
Team knowledge:  Another proactive approach involves ensuring that the entire construction 
team knows the projects- from the crew, to the QC inspectors, to the Company leadership.
Chain of Command visits:  This is another proactive approach that accomplishes several 
things:
1) It encourages team knowledge.  No one wants to be on the job site and have an 
uneducated answer to a simple question from the Commanding Officer.




n Safety Mishap Investigations
Course Objectives Quality ApproachesHOFsEngineered Systems
A reactive approach is an approach that system operators take to ensure 
quality by determining the best ways to fix errors after they have happened 
and by passing on knowledge about errors so that they do not occur in the 
future.
QC Inspections:  All system operators need to conscientiously document the 
errors discovered during QC inspections and follow-up with each other to 
ensure that the agreed upon remedies are implemented.
Safety Mishap Investigations:  These are crucial tools for the chain of 
command to use to follow up on safety mishaps and ensure that the 





Course Objectives Quality ApproachesHOFsEngineered Systems
An interactive approach is an approach that system operators take to ensure 
quality by iteratively examining and acting on a particular activity to ensure 
quality while the activity is occurring.
QC inspections are also interactive because they often document ongoing 
activities and help operators ensure quality at all intermediate steps.
Crisis Management:  This is the most readily apparent method of managing an 
activity as it is unfolding.  As military units, NMCBs value crisis management in 




n Thanks for your time
n A new way to look at our jobs
n Any questions?
This is a new way to look at our jobs, because it incorporates the human factor 
into our operational planning.  A building is more than the sum of the concrete 
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From: Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRST NAVAL CONSTRUCTION DIVISION (1NCD)/
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES COMMAND (NCFC) AND MODIFICATION
OF ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES (NCF)
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3111.14V
(b) BUPERSINST 7040.6
(c) OPNAVNOTE 5400 of 14 Jun 02
1. Purpose. To approve establishment of FIRST Naval
Construction Division (1NCD)/Naval Construction Forces Command
(NCFC) and modification of Atlantic and Pacific Naval
Construction Forces (NCF) under the administrative chain of
command of the Chief of Naval Operations per reference (a).
2. Background. The Naval Construction Division concept resulted
from the NCF Alignment Study completed in FY-01 and approved by
the Chief of Naval Operations. This action unifies the Atlantic
and Pacific Naval Construction Force (NCF). The Commander 1NCD
shall report for additional duty to CINCPACFLT and for concurrent
duty Commander, Naval Construction Forces Command to Commander
Fleet Forces Command, and shall serve as the single command
interface with CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR for
Seabee operations. The Commander, FIRST Naval Construction
Division (1NCD) shall have concurrent duty as Commander, Naval
Construction Forces Command (NCFC), and shall serve as the single
command interface with Commander Fleet Forces Command to develop,
coordinate, and implement policy and requirements to man, equip
and train Seabees. The Commander 1NCD/NCFC will be located at
Little Creek, VA in spaces currently occupied by the SECOND Naval
Construction Brigade. Two existing active duty Naval
Construction Regiments (NCRs) are realigned under 1NCD, the
TWENTY-SECOND NCR, which will relocate from Little Creek, VA to
Gulfport, MS, and the THIRTIETH NCR located in Pearl Harbor, HI.
Four existing reserve regiments (3NCR – Atlanta, GA, 7NCR -
Newport, RI, 1NCR – Port Hueneme, CA, and 9NCR – Dallas, TX) are
also realigned under 1NCD. This action will enhance Seabee
readiness, improve alignment and operational effectiveness, and
promote efficiencies within the Naval Construction Force (NCF).
3. Organizational Change. Establish Commander, FIRST Naval
Construction Division (1NCD)/Commander, Naval Construction Forces
Command (NCFC) and modify Atlantic and Pacific Naval Construction
Forces effective 1 August 2002. Effect Permanent Duty Station
(PDS) Change for TWENTY-SECOND NCR to Gulfport, MS effective
1 October 2002. The following applies:
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
2000 NAVY PENTAGON 
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000 
OPNAVNOTE 3111
26 July 2002
a. Establishment Effective Date
Commander 1 August 2002
FIRST Naval Construction Division
and Commander
Naval Construction Forces Command
1310 8th St Suite 100
Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek
Norfolk VA 23521-2435




Officer in Charge 1 August 2002
FIRST Naval Construction Division
Forward
258 Makalapa Drive Suite 200
Pearl Harbor HI 96860-3121
(SNDL: 39B) (UIC: 57046)
(PLA: FIRST NCD (FORWARD)
PEARL HARBOR HI)
(PDS: Pearl Harbor, HI)
Commander 1 August 2002
Seabee Readiness Group Atlantic
4902 Marvin Shields Blvd
Gulfport MS 39501-5005
(SNDL: 39K2 ) (UIC: 55460)
(PLA: SEABEE READINESS GROUP LANT
GULFPORT MS)
(PDS: Gulfport, MS)
Commander 1 August 2002
Seabee Readiness Group Pacific
2551 Pacific Rd Suite 2
Port Hueneme CA 93043-4332
(SNDL: 39K1) (UIC: 55752)
(PLA: SEABEE READINESS GROUP PAC
PORT HUENEME CA)




b. Disestablishment Effective Date
Commander 1 August 2002
SECOND Naval Construction Brigade
1310 8th St Suite 100
Norfolk VA 23521-2435
(SNDL: 39B1) (UIC: 57034)
(PLA: COM SECOND NCB LITTLE CREEK VA)
(PDS: Norfolk, VA)
Commander 1 August 2002
THIRD Naval Construction Brigade
258 Makalapa Drive Suite 200
Pearl Harbor HI 96860-3121
(SNDL: 39B2) (UIC: 57046)
(PLA: COM THIRD NCB PEARL HARBOR HI)
(PDS: Pearl Harbor, HI)
Officer in Charge 1 August 2002
SECOND Naval Construction Brigade
Det Gulfport
5606 CBC 6th St
Gulfport MS 39501-5005
(SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 35554)
(PLA: SECOND NCB DET GULFPORT MS)
(PDS: Gulfport, MS)
Commander 1 August 2002
COM TWO ZERO NCR
4902 Marvin Shields Blvd
Gulfport MS 39501-5002
(SNDL: 39C1) (UIC: 55460)
(PLA: COM TWO ZERO NCR GULFPORT MS)
(PDS: Gulfport, MS)
Commander 1 August 2002
COM THREE ONE NCR
1991 Pacific Rd
Port Hueneme CA 93043-4306
(SNDL: 39C2) (UIC: 55752)
(PLA: COM THREE ONE NCR PORT HUENEMA CA)







COM TWO TWO NCR COM TWO TWO NCR
Unit 60507 4902 Marvin Shields Blvd
FPO AE 09501-7058 Gulfport MS 39501-50
(SNDL: 39C1) (UIC: 55614) (SNDL: 39C1) (UIC: 55614)
(PLA: COM TWO TWO NCR LITTLE (PLA: COM TWO TWO NCR)
CREEK VA) (PDS: Gulfport, MS)
(PDS: Little Creek, VA)
d. TITLE CHANGE
From To
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
SECOND Naval Construction Brigade FIRST NCD Detachment
Det Atlantic Atlantic
FPO AA 34051 FPO AA 34051-5000
(SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 35182) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 35182)
(PLA: SECOND NCB DET ATLANTIC) (PLA: FIRST NCD DET
(PDS: Roosevelt Road, PR) ATLANTIC)
(PDS: Roosevelt Road, PR)
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
SECOND Naval Construction Brigade FIRST NCD Detachment Europe
Det Europe PSC 819 Box 38
PSC 819 Box 38 FPO AE 09645-4000
FPO AE 09645-4000
(SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 41908) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 41908)
(PLA: SECOND NCB DET EUROPE) (PLA: FIRST NCD DET EUROPE)
(PDS: Rota, Spain) (PDS: Rota, Spain)
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
SECOND Naval Construction Brigade FIRST NCD Det Sigonella
Det Sigonella Unit 50068
Unit 50068 PSC 819 Box 38
FPO AE 09627-2800 FPO AE 09645
(SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 41909) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 41909)
(PLA: SECOND NCB DET SIGONELLA (PLA: FIRST NCD DET
IT) SIGONELLA IT)




Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
THIRD NCB Det GU FIRST NCD Det Guam
PSC 455 Box 181 Bldg 556
FPO AP 96540-2970 FPO AP 96601-4629
(SNDL: 39F2) (UIC: 53878) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 53878)
(PLA: THIRD NCB DET GU) (PLA: FIRST NCD DET GUAM)
(PDS: Guam) (PDS: Guam)
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
THIRD NCB Det Okinawa FIRST NCD Det Okinawa
PSC 480 PSC 480
FPO AP 96370-0059 FPO AP 96370-0059
(SNDL: 39F2) (UIC: 53882) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 53882)
(PLA: THIRD NCB DET OKINAWA JA) (PLA: FIRST NCD DET OKINAWA)
(PDS: Okinawa, JA) (PDS: Okinawa, JA)
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
THIRD NCB Det Port Hueneme THREE Zero NCR Det
2251 Pacific Rd Suite 2 Port Hueneme CA
Port Hueneme CA 93043-4332 2251 Pacific Rd Suite 2
Port Hueneme CA 93043-4332
(SNDL: 39F2) (UIC: 43303) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 43303)
(PLA: THIRD NCB DET PORT HUENEME (PLA: THIRTIETH NCR DET
CA) Port Hueneme CA)
(PDS: Port Hueneme, CA) (PDS: Port Hueneme, CA)
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
SECOND Naval Construction FIRST NCD Det Atlanta
Brigade Det Atlanta Bldg 70
Bldg 70 Naval Air Station Atlanta
Naval Air Station Atlanta Marietta GA 30060-5099
Marietta GA 30060-5099
(SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 49993) (SNDL: 39F1) (UIC: 49993)
(PLA: SECOND NCB DET ATLANTA (PLA: FIRST NCD DET ATLANTA
GA) GA)
(PDS: Atlanta, GA) (PDS: Atlanta, GA)
Officer in Charge Officer in Charge
COM TWO ZERO NCR Det SRGLANT Det Camp Lejeune
Camp Lejeune P O Box 20114
Sneads Ferry Rd Bldg 901 Camp Lejeune NC 28542
P O Box 20114
Camp Lejeune NC 28542-0114
(SNDL: 39C1) (UIC: 49992) (SNDL: 39C1) (UIC: 49992)
(PLA: COM TWO ZERO NCR DET (PLA: SRGLANT DET CAMP
CAMP LEJEUNE NC) LEJEUNE NC)




e. Mission. To organize, train, operate and maintain the
Naval Construction Force, to command and control echelon IV Naval
Construction Force Commands, and to develop, coordinate and
implement policy and requirements to man, equip and train
Seabees. In exercising this mission, FIRST Naval Construction
Division (1NCD) and Naval Construction Forces Command (NCFC) will
provide combat construction forces to fulfill operational and
forward engagemet requirements of a Combatant or Component
Commander; contingency and deliberate planning in support of
OPLANs, training for Naval Construction Force units, and
contributory construction support to Naval Shore Activities.
FIRST Naval Construction Division (1NCD) and Naval Construction
Forces Command (NCFC) will execute operations covering the full
spectrum of engineering and construction tasks through task
tailored units deployed around the world within the full spectrum
of threat environments. A substantial percentage of operations
will be prosecuted in joint/combined scenarios. Through its
assigned units, FIRST Naval Construction Division (1NCD) and
Naval Construction Forces Command (NCFC), supports Unified
Commanders, Fleet Commanders in Chief, and Component Commanders.
FIRST Naval Construction Division (1NCD) and Naval Construction
Forces Command (NCFC) will sustain the required operational
capabilities to perform assigned primary missions in all
projected operational environments while maintaining command and
control of assigned forces.
f. Major Claimant. CINCLANTFLT
g. OPNAV Resource Sponsor. N44
h. Administrative Assignment. Commander in Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet to be exercised by:
Echelon Administrative Chain of Command
3 Commander, FIRST Naval Construction
Division*
(FIRST Naval Construction Division Forward)
(FIRST Naval Construction Division Det
Atlantic)
(FIRST Naval Construction Division Det
Europe)





(FIRST Naval Construction Division Det
Guam)
(FIRST Naval Construction Division Det
Okinawa)
(FIRST Naval Construction Division Det
Atlanta)
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 401
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 402
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 403
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 405
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 406
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 410
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 411
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 412
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 413
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 414
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 415
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 416
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 417
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 418
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 420
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 421
4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 422





4 Officer in Charge, Naval Construction
Battalion Unit 427
4 Commander, FIRST Naval Construction
Regiment
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion SEVENTEEN
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion EIGHTEEN
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Construction
Force Support Unit TWO
5 Commanding Officer, Construction
Battalion Maintenance Unit
THREE ZERO THREE
4 Commander, THIRD Naval Construction
Regiment
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion FOURTEEN
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion TWO THREE
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion TWO FOUR
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Construction
Force Support Unit THREE
4 Commander, SEVENTH Naval Construction
Regiment
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion TW0 ONE
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion TWO SIX
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion TWO SEVEN
5 Commanding Officer, Construction
Battalion Maintenance Unit
TWO ZERO TWO
4 Commander, NINTH Naval Construction
Regiment
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion FIFTEEN
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battaion TWO TWO
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile




5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion TWO EIGHT
4 Commander, TWO TWO Naval Construction
Regiment
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion ONE
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion SEVEN
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion SEVEN FOUR
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion ONE THREE
THREE
5 Commanding Officer, Underwater
Construction Team ONE
4 Commander, THREE ZERO Naval Construction
Regiment
(THREE ZERO NCR Det Port Hueneme)
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion THREE
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion FOUR
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion FIVE
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion FOUR ZERO
5 Commanding Officer, Underwater
Construction Team TWO
4 Commander, Seabee Readiness Group Atlantic
(Seabee Readiness Group Atlantic Det
Camp Lejeune)
4 Commander, Seabee Readiness Group Pacific
*Concurrent duty as Commander, Naval Construction Forces Command
4. Action
a. For prospective Commander, FIRST Naval Construction
Division\Commander, Naval Construction Forces Command: Action is




b. This is advance change 38-02 to enclosure (5) of
reference (c). DNS-RMC2 will revise SNDL.
5. Cancellation Contingency. This notice may be retained for
reference purposes. The organization action will remain






SNDL B2A (Special Agencies, Staffs, Boards and Committees)
(DFAS Cleveland (Code ABB2) and Pensacola (AOD)
only)
B2E (National Imagery and Mapping Agency Components and
Elements (Washington DC (Code MS D44 only))
B2F (MIL POSTAL SVC AGCY/JT MIL POSTAL ACTIVITIES and
Mobile Mail Centers) (EXEC DIR MIL POSTAL SVC AGCY
Alexandria, only)
21A1 (CINCLANTFLT) (Code N4621A)
21A2 (CINCPACFLT) (Code 46)
21A3 (COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE)
(CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK, only)
23C (COMNAVRESFOR)
24J1 (MARINE CORPS FORCES COMMANDS) (COMMARFORLANT, and
COMMARFORPAC, only)
C28M (NAVNETSPAOPSCOMDET) (Code N31)
FG6 (NCTAMS)
FJA10 (NAVMAC) (Code 30, 54)




FKM18 (NAVTRANSSUPPCEN) (Code 031)
OPNAV Principal Officials
N122C1, N100E3, N44, N441
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U.S. NAVY SEABEES – CAN DO 
WITH COMPASSION FOR OTHERS 
WE BUILD – WE FIGHT 
FOR PEACE WITH FREEDOM 
